Jim
Herrick’s Humanism is a very introductory introduction. It is made up
roughly of two parts. The first eight chapters deal in general terms with the
humanist tradition and its relation to philosophy, religion, morality, science,
and the arts. The final five chapters are concerned with humanism in action. We
are told about the various humanist organizations around the world, their
history and publications, as well as the humanist line on various social issues
such as the environment.

With only one hundred pages to play with, Herrick eschews
argument for a direct statement of doctrine. Humanism thus reads rather
like an extended pamphlet. Taking the limitations of its format into account,
the book is quite good. It is accessible and informative. However, it contains
problems that cannot be put down only to lack of space.

Humanism,
Herrick begins, is a "philosophy of life" that emphasises the "human,
the here-and-now, the humane" (p. 1). Humanism, in a different
formulation, is "atheism/agnosticism with values" (p. 2). To be an
atheist, according to Herrick, is to be "without a concept of god",
while to be an agnostic is to be "without knowledge of a conceivable god"
(p. 13). Herrick then outlines fourteen theses that provide support for both atheism
and agnosticism.

Herrick provides us, then, with a fairly straightforward and
familiar characterisation of humanism. The humanist emphasis on the human
necessarily demands the denial of god. To negate the non-human and the
supernatural, in the form of god, is also to affirm the human and the natural.
That is the core thought of humanism. But it is not as straightforward as one
might suppose. A theist might claim that the most valuable way of emphasizing
the human and the here-and-now is precisely to be conscious, or to feel the
presence, of god in day-to-day activity. In other words, theism is an
alternative route to humanism. In light of the foregoing remarks, it is
reasonable to think that the core idea of humanism probably needs a bit of
elaboration. That Herrick does not devote even one chapter to it, then, is a
little frustrating.

In an attempt to illuminate humanism, Herrick goes on to
invoke an array of other theories. Humanism, he tells us, involves in various
ways: scepticism, pragmatism, utilitarianism (p. 19), secularism (p. 30), the
theory of evolution, and big bang theory (p. 44). We want to ask at this point:
to what extent is Herrick talking specifically about humanism when he mobilises
this fairly heterogeneous group of ‘–isms’ on its behalf? Does the concept of
humanism have any substantive meaning of its own beyond atheism, agnosticism,
scepticism, pragmatism, and so forth? If it does, then it would be nice to know
what it is; if it does not, then perhaps we can do without the concept in its
philosophical sense. Our worry, in short, is that humanism means either far too
much, or nothing much at all. Herrick’s thoughts on this prima facie problem
would have been welcome.

The particular brand of ambiguity that the concept of
humanism exhibits leaves it vulnerable to misuse. There is much that can be
peddled, in other words, beneath the humanist banner. Something like this
occurs when Herrick writes about morality. At the beginning of the book,
Herrick states that humanists "derive their moral codes from human need"
(p. 2). In chapter four, we are told that the humanist is committed both to the
social contract (pp. 23-4) and utilitarianism (p. 27). And finally, in chapter
nine, Herrick informs us that "[h]umanist morality is largely based on
reciprocity" (p. 59).

Human needs are multifarious. And they are certainly not all
fulfilled by the ethical materials that we find in the moralities of fairness,
happiness, and reciprocity. Humanist ethics, strictly speaking, extends far
beyond the rather arbitrary and narrow limits set by Herrick. There are very
significant parts of the ethical life that answer to human need, and yet have
little to do with fairness, happiness, and reciprocity. Herrick is silent about
them. Instead, he selects his preferred moral vision, and presents it as the
one and only humanist morality. It seems that in this case the semantic
promiscuity of the concept of humanism has the final laugh.

©
2006 Ruben Berrios

Ruben
Berrios is a philosopher whose research interests are in ethics and aesthetics.
He has taught philosophy at University College Dublin, the University of
Ulster, and Queen’s University Belfast.

Categories: Philosophical