In this volume, Harvard psychoanalyst and
psychiatrist Arnold Modell argues for the systematic integration of
first-person experiential accounts and third-person explanations of mind and
brain.  The dominant computational/
representational models in cognitive science, he claims, have not provided an
adequate understanding of our ability to produce meaning in ordinary life.  In failing to describe the uniquely human capacity
for imagination and metaphor, says Modell, the cognitive sciences have
effectively dehumanized the mind.

Drawing
heavily on Lakoff and Johnson, Modell maintains that the biological source of
imagination is embodied, unconscious metaphor. 
As a cognitive process, metaphor involves a mental projection or
transfer of meaning between dissimilar domains.  These projections allow us to achieve psychic homeostasis within
dynamic, ever-changing experience. 
Aided by reports from his own patients, Modell shows how meaning may
exist as potentiality in the unconscious imagination.  His theory attempts to explain important
phenomena in memory, in creative discoveries, in the sublimation and
transformation of feelings, and in our ability to overcome psychic trauma.  Finally, Modell describes how imagination
can be enhanced by empathy and projective identification.  Modell finds support for his view in a wide
variety of disciplines including psychoanalysis, linguistics, cognitive
psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology, philosophy of language and
mind.

I found
this book to be accessible and refreshing. 
I agree with Modell’s overall critique of standard approaches in the
study of mind and brain.  I also agree
with his expectation that classical models will likely be replaced by very
different methodologies that derive from non-linear dynamics.  Not surprisingly, the eclecticism of
Modell’s approach led to some frustrations. 
Modell plunges into diverse sources (particularly on the philosophical
front) that are not easily reconciled. 
There are far too many quotes throughout.  Annoyingly, he targets Descartes for the western view of mind as
disembodied, static, and representational. 
This is a gross over-simplification. 
Modell could just have easily have blamed Plato for mind/body dualism
and Aristotle for the static, representational theory of mind.  Unfortunately, Modell does not offer
detailed prescriptions for integrating diverse methodologies of neurobiology,
psychiatry, phenomenology, etc.

 It is exciting to see a renewed interest
in the study of imagination.  During much of the 20th century, imagination was regarded
as unscientific, and the existence of mental imagery was often denied
outright.  The topic remains ubiquitous
and difficult to research.  Modell has
argued convincingly that a phenomenologically informed study of imagination is
key to understanding the most sophisticated of our abilities.  In so doing, Modell proposes a promising
framework for humanizing the study of mind and mental health.

© 2004 Allison Barnes

Allison Barnes, Ph.D., Philosophy
Department, University of Victoria, 
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada 

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology