Among many philosophers, talk about
sentimentality, kitsch or erotic love is just not done. Yet in Defense of
Sentimentality, Solomon talks specifically about those emotions so often
and so easily dismissed by philosophers.  While post-modernism, feminism and
cognitive science have by now quite adequately wiped out the dichotomy between
emotion and reason, Solomon does not merely emphasize this by now
well-established interconnection between the two. He goes one step further and
takes aim at the philosopher’s contempt for what are more often than not
considered to be lowly emotions, such as horror, gratitude, sentimentality and the
desire for vengeance. He then proceeds to question "the emphasis on
dullness and self-righteousness as a prominent feature of philosophical and
political discussions of the virtues" (p. 186). Rather than continuing
this focus on dull and big theories, Solomon concentrates on the ways in which
we actually experience emotions such as a fondness for kitsch, enthusiasm,
energy and being "turned on" (emotions considered at best feeble by
the philosophical establishment) and explores in refreshing and amusing ways
their virtues. It is the stuff, says Solomon, whether philosophers like it or
not, of which the human condition is made and without which civilized life
would simply be impossible.

Of specific interest are Solomon’s
essays The Virtue of (Erotic) Love and Comic Relief: In Appreciation
of The Seven Deadly Sins. In the former, Solomon criticizes the marginal
role sex receives in discussions of virtue (if anything, virtuous sexuality
generally turns out to be understood on one way only: abstinence) and carries
on in defense of erotic and romantic love.

In Comic Relief: In Appreciation
of The Seven Deadly Sins, Solomon discusses "Ethics for Losers"
(p. 140). This discussion includes the seven sins, which are, in Solomon’s
view, humiliating and pathetic yet routine features of human behavior, hardly
sins and much less ‘deadly.’ Solomon wonders why there are so few sins, and
why, for example, the list does not include things such as hatred or
uncontrolled dandruff, all of which makes for a sharp, funny and insightful
essay.

Sympathy and Vengeance is a
similarly astute essay. In it, Solomon discusses justice: not as an overarching
theoretical ideal, but rather as a personal virtue. We react to injury with
resentment, and vengeance is the natural consequence of this resentment. Our
desire for vengeance and its built in sense of fairness, says Solomon, are
integral to our recognition of evil. And this, the way we actually feel and
behave in the face of injustice, says Solomon, should be the foundation of our ideas
about justice. Justice is found in ourselves, he concludes, not in large
theories.

Having said that, the image Solomon
paints of himself throughout the book (albeit tacitly), as a lone hero fighting
for a better recognition of emotions, is a bit off. It is a picture a bit too
dismal of the place of the emotions in philosophy. The interconnection between
the emotions and cognition is by now well established, thanks to feminists,
post-modernists and cognitive scientists. Furthermore, many, especially women
philosophers, have also (and sometimes more persuasively) unraveled and
established the crucial role of emotions in ethics. Yet one of the most
instrumental among them, Nell Noddings, guru of the ethics of care and a
heroine for concentrating on the role of care in women’s experience in the
establishment of ethical theory, is swiftly dismissed by Solomon for, as he
sees it, having misunderstood care to be essentialist female and for
subsequently politicizing that point. Other thinkers who have done persuasive
work on the role of emotions, such as Luce Irigaray, Martha Nussbaum, Iris
Murdoch, bell hooks, Allison Jaggar and Joan Tronto to name just a few, are
never mentioned at all, unless his dismissal of "several New Age feminist
thinkers" (p. 49) was meant to include them all.

Despite this small note of
criticism, In Defense of Sentimentality is witty, funny and surprising
and a great read for philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Having a sense of
humor, says Solomon, is divine. The way Solomon uses a sense of humor to come
to the defense of emotions not always considered in need of defense, really is
divine.

© 2006
Gerda Wever-Rabehl

Gerda
Wever-Rabehl holds a Ph.D from Simon Fraser University, and has published
extensively in the areas of social science, philosophy and philosophy of
education.

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology