It is accepted
wisdom in philosophy as much as in psychology that humans, and quite possibly
some other primates, have a seemingly effortless and spontaneous ability to
make sense of each other in terms of behavioural dispositions and psychological
attributes. Such ability is often compared In humans) to a naïve psychology, a
kind of rough-and-ready collection of popular notions and conceptions that
allows us to understand one another and negotiate the spaces in between.
Equally consensual is the idea that the scope of interpretation is either the
mind or behaviour, with any leftover disagreements ranging over what this
interpretative ability consists in (is it theory-like, or simulation-like?),
why do we have it (primarily to understand others, or ourselves?), and how best
to approach it theoretically (is it innate or learned, modular or
general-purpose?).

Against the
backdrop of this generalized consensus that interpretation is about minds (or mindful
behaviour), Bogdan’s book is bound to step on some toes. For not only does he
emphatically reject that our folk psychological pronouncements on each other
aim to single out internal mental causes of our actions (however these may be
understood), but he is certain that without bringing in evolutionary theory we
won’t even be able to understand what interpretation is about and how it
accomplishes its tasks. The core thesis of the book can be summarized as the
claim that interpretation is an evolved adaptation whose aims are eminently
practical and pointed at opportunities for an interpreter to get involved in
social interactions. In this sense, our interpretative skills came about as the
result of communal, political and epistemic pressures to figure out or do
something about another’s goals whenever they cross the path of one’s own. In
the beginning, those pressures were down to natural selection and for those
primates other than humans who interpret they stay at that level. Human
interpretation, however, is mostly under cultural pressure and responds to the
constraints brought upon it by cultural norms.  The important point to retain
is that, both in its history and in its practice, whether natural or cultural,
interpretation has no need for minds. Its success comes down to its ability to
track the interpreted subject’s relations to world insofar as these afford
opportunities to promote the interpreter’s goals and, ultimately, his
biological fitness. Not surprisingly, cognitive scientists more used to reason
from the armchair and convinced that their task is to figure out how we
represent the other’s mental states are bound to find much to quarrel with in Bogdan’s
book.

For myself, I
should say that I’m in agreement with Bogdan’s position. Without bringing in
evolutionary considerations, we are likely to have a distorted view of what
minds are for and, consequently, how they do their job. What is more, bringing
in evolution alerts us to the fact that – as a rule – nature always follows the
path of least effort. This basically means that if our making sense of each
other can be done without involving complicated and time consuming
representations of another’s mental architecture, then that is the most likely
way we do it. Equally important, evolutionary reasoning disciplines us to keep
the focus on the practical aims of our cognitive skills, an aspect often
forgotten by mainstream cognitive science. Bogdan’s book is a well-argued
example of just how much our understanding of the mind can benefit from taking
on an evolutionary stance and puts together a rather convincing case for the
practicality of interpretation.

The book is to be
recommended to all those interested in issues of the mind, be they
philosophers, evolutionary, developmental or social psychologists, cognitive
and cultural anthropologists, or simply curious about our ways of making sense
of one another. The style of the book is accessible to both novice and expert,
and Bogdan writes in a light, entertaining way without compromising rigour. An
important contribution to current cognitive sciences that merits close
attention.

© 2004 Isabel Gois

Isabel Gois is a
PhD student at King’s College London working on Consciousness. Her research
interests include Philosophy of Mind, Neuropsychology, and Mental Disorder. She
has articles published on Emotions, Computationalism, and Consciousness.       

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology