Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness is a well-researched and well-argued contribution to Kantian studies. In it Guyer redresses a common misunderstanding of Kant’s moral philosophy. Although it can seem that Kant, in an apparent disregard for human freedom, demands a grit-your-teeth-and-bear-it blind obedience to moral law for its own sake, Guyer argues that this perspective is distorted, since it overlooks the fact that the foundation of Kant’s entire moral philosophy is his belief in the absolute value of freedom (15). Adherence to the moral law is demanded by Kant because it is only by means of conformity to this law that the greatest good, i.e., freedom, can be preserved and enhanced. The moral law is an imposition that curtails personal freedom only so long as personal purposes are at odds with it — that is, just in case one seeks personal advantage at the expense of the freedom of all. When there is fundamental agreement between personal purposes and the purposes of a universally valid will, inclination is then an expression of freedom, so “obedience to the moral law” does not necessarily curtail human freedom. When one’s will agrees with itself a priori moral action turns out to be a free expression of self-consistent, or virtuous, will. Only such unity as this, Kant suggests, can serve as a sure ground for both moral action and for happiness. Hence, our greatest end consists in the achievement of happiness, defined as the realization of the system of maximally compossible human ends.

This general line of argument forms the core of Guyer’s book. It is preceded by an exposition of the historical developments that led Kant to these ideas and followed by an explanation of the relationship of these ideas to various aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy. In Part II, for example, Guyer elucidates the relationship that the absolute value of freedom has to the various formulations of the Categorical Imperative. In Part III Guyer discusses, among other things, Kant’s strategy for the reconciliation of the role of the state, and the institution of property, with the supreme value of human freedom. Finally, in Part IV Guyer turns to the possibility of the realization of human happiness and freedom within human history. Here he considers Kant’s position on the postulates of God, freedom, and immortality, as well as Kant’s views on issues relating to liberty, and the role of governments in world peace.

Throughout his investigations Guyer retains his focus on freedom as the golden thread that ties together Kant’s practical philosophy. He argues, above all, for a shift in perspective from seeing Kant’s moral theory in a constrictive light, to seeing it in a constructive light. He suggests, for example, that although “the moral law is ordinarily interpreted as establishing the framework of constraints within which individual happiness can be pursued by the negative limiting conditions of respect for rational beings as ends rather than means…” careful investigation reveals that it actually mandates the satisfaction of ends consistent with the encouragement of universal freedom and therefore happiness (340).

Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness is an important book in Kantian studies that advances a unifying vision of Kant’s practical philosophy. The change of view that Guyer advocates is welcome and reveals a side of Kant that has perhaps been veiled for too long. Although the book will undoubtedly be of interest to anyone studying Kant’s practical philosophy in a scholarly manner, it may also be of interest to the general reader of philosophy who is prepared to approach the book with the patience and tenacity that Guyer’s extended arguments often demand. In either case readers will be rewarded for their efforts with a deeper understanding of both Kant and of central philosophical issues related to freedom, happiness and morality.

Michael Kurak writes about himself: My area of specialization is Philosophy of Mind – broadly construed to include a number of related areas including cognitive science and Asian Philosophy. I recently graduated with a Ph.D. from the University of Warwick, but have, thus far, not been offered a philosophy position. I am currently teaching senior public school for the Toronto District School Board, in Canada, and am continuing my philosophical pursuits as time permits. In general terms, my work examines and develops theories that attempt to unite mind, metaphysics, and morality in a way that permits practical applications.

Categories: Philosophical