The
Matrix films spawned a huge amount of philosophical interest and
discussion among lay people and philosophers alike, striking a chord in people
in a manner not unlike Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance did
in the ’70s.  The films have spawned at least half a dozen books to date
exploring the philosophy of the Matrix, one of the latest being Like a
Splinter in Your Mind.

As
a general introduction to the standard themes in philosophy for a
non-philosopher, Like a Splinter in Your Mind is a reasonable if not
profound read.  The basics are covered:  Cartesian dualism, materialism,
compatibilism and the varieties of free will, knowledge versus experience,
subjectively versus objectively defined morality:  who decides what’s morally "right"? 
For persons interested in mental health issues, it presents the standard
philosophical arguments over the nature of reality that go to the heart of how
we define sanity as participation in a socially shared reality.  For fans of
the Matrix films, it attempts a consistent explanation of all the
pop philosophy in the films, in a manner reminiscent of discussions among truly
committed fans of any cult film or TV series who are determined to have an
explanation for everything even when it goes far beyond what the writers could
possibly have had in mind.

That
said, if thought-provoking is what you’re after, there are much better books
out there:  Philosophers Explore the Matrix, featuring essays by some of
the best-known names in philosophy, comes to mind.  Lawrence’s analysis of the
many philosophical areas he presents often feels annoyingly superficial; and he
makes a number of claims that I find quite surprising:  for example, that "the
‘Matrix scenario’ seems to suggest, on the face of it at least, a materialist
view of the mind" (p. 33) or that "…these days most scientists and
philosophers think that materialism is the only viable theory" (p. 37).

Materialism
(generally equated with physicalism, though philosophers mean slightly
different thing by each) is, of course, the metaphysical position that matter —
physical "stuff" — is the only kind of "stuff" that really
exists.  Cartesian dualism (named after Rene Descartes of cogito ergo sum fame)
holds, in contrast, that "mental stuff" and "physical stuff"
are fundamentally different and irreconcilable things.  So for the dualist,
mind and brain are different things, and each could exist, in principle,
without the other; whereas for the committed materialist, mind simply is brain.

Materialism
certainly is the dominant paradigm of the day, in philosophy or
science, at least in the West.  But to present materialism as the only alternative
to Cartesian dualism, as Lawrence does, is simply wrong.  For starters, there
is what might be called mentalism, which holds that "mental stuff" is
the only kind of "stuff" that really exists, and that all we perceive
as physical reality ultimately exists only in the mind:  arguably a likelier
reading of the "Matrix scenario", where the "real" world
itself may be just another level of virtual reality, a figment of the mind.

There
is also my metaphysical position of choice, neutral monism, which holds that
both "mental stuff" and "physical stuff", in the
philosophical jargon, supervene on (are determined by) a third kind of "stuff",
not directly observable, that has aspects of both the mental and the physical. 
That "mental stuff" and "physical stuff" seem such
different things — as to most people they do — is a necessary function of our
limited perspective "inside the system".  If we could step "outside
the system", we would perceive "mental stuff" and "physical
stuff" for the unified stuff they really are.  Neutral monism has been
championed by some prominent names in philosophy, notably Baruch Spinoza and
William James.

Lawrence’s
insistence on only two alternatives, Cartesian dualism or materialism,
extends into other areas.  So for instance he talks about "moral
objectivism" (some actions are objectively moral) and "moral
non-objectivism" (no actions are objectively moral) as mutually exclusive
and exhaustive:  "ultimately each of us must decide which of these two
positions will serve as the basis of our moral beliefs" (p. 103).  But
there are moral systems that do not concern themselves with whether they are
objectively or subjectively defined, but instead focus on personal choice and
responsibility.  (I think Sartre can best be read in this light, rather than as
the subjectivist Lawrence makes him out to be.)

 Such
systems may appear at various times objectivist or non-objectivist depending on
how your are viewing them.  What matters in such systems is that you choose,
and that you take responsibility for your actions.  Intriguingly, Lawrence
notes Neo’s emphasis on choice and responsibility in both the second and third films
and his response to Agent Smith, in their final battle:  "You must know it
by now. You can’t win. It’s pointless to keep fighting. Why, Mr. Anderson?
Why?! Why do you persist?!" "Because I choose to."

The
best chapter in the book, I found, was the one on the construction of race and
gender in the Matrix, with its suggestion that race and gender are equally
constructed categories in our world, the imposition of which onto the
individual has serious consequences for his mental health and well-being.  Foucault
comes to mind.  (Gender, at least, has some biological basis, while, as many
scientists have been keen to point out, race really has none.)

Zion
is presented as a social ideal, free of the racism and sexism prevalent in the
re-creation of the late twentieth century inside the Matrix.  Computer
programs, logically, have neither race nor gender (ascribing either one is an
example of what philosophers call a category error); yet in the world of the
Matrix, they take on both.  It is the "minority programs", particularly
the "programs of color", Lawrence notes, who overwhelmingly are the
ones to assist the Zion rebels, "most likely related to the racism and
sexism among the programs themselves" (p. 86).  (Interesting footnote: 
Cornell West, the prominent Princeton philosopher on issues of race, appears in
the films as Zion’s Councilor West.)

Like
a Splinter in Your Mind is
an enjoyable read, and it reads quickly:  you can take it in with one sitting,
if you choose to.  As Lawrence says in the introduction, "philosophy calls
on us to question everything — especially those things that seem most obvious". 
Whatever the merits of his arguments otherwise, this, I think, is something
that all philosophers can agree with him on.

 

 

Pirsig, Robert
(2006).  Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance:  An Inquiry into Values. 
Harper Torch

Grau,
Christopher, ed. (2005).  Philosophers Explore the Matrix.  Oxford
University Press.

 

© 2006 Joel Parthemore

 

Joel Parthemore is a second-year DPhil student studying
knowledge representation formalisms and the nature of conceptual knowledge at
the University of Sussex in Brighton, UK.  He is a member of the Philosophy of
AI and Cognitive Science research group in the Department of Informatics. In his
spare time he plays with Linux computer systems. You can find him online at joel@parthemores.com or http://www.parthemores.com/research.

Categories: Philosophical