Would the first fully conscious
humans have perceived themselves as categorically different from the other
creatures that inhabited their world? 
If, let’s say, they came across a wildebeest (or Neanderthal) down at
the community watering hole, would they have understood that their own type of
consciousness – – their self-consciousness – – was of a completely
different sort from that of the other creatures they encountered? And if so, as the only self-aware creatures
they knew of, did they ask those most archetypal of questions – – how they came
to be here, where they came from, and ultimately, what it means to be human?

At least as far back as we have literature and art,
we know that our species has asked what it means to be human. Now that science has largely displaced the
formerly satisfying religious answers to this question, the issue has taken on
an even more compelling urgency. Malik
believes the way we answer this question has implications in all areas of our
lives.

The breadth of
Kenan Malik’s background is evident in
this complex and well-written book. He
was trained first in neurobiology and later in the history and philosophy of
science. In between these two academic
pursuits, he worked as a research psychologist, and since 1990 has focused
exclusively on writing, lecturing and thinking.

Malik explains the purpose of the
book thus: "Are humans just animals? Are minds just machines? And what
does it say about our age that such ideas appear both scientifically plausible
and culturally acceptable? These are the issues at the heart of Man, Beast
and Zombie."

It
is important that we get a proper understanding of human nature, Malik
explains, because "The debate about the science of Man is . . . not simply
an academic discussion. It is about how
we see ourselves – and how we wish to see ourselves – and the world in which we
live…. It has become commonplace to think of humans as simply beasts or zombies"
(pp. 24-25).

Malik’s decision to use the term beast
in this book is a jibe at those who would suggest humans are simply
well-adapted animals, not qualitatively different than other creatures; and the
term zombie refers to the concept that living among us are apparently
animate but actually mindless beings. "[A]
zombie is a human being who seems perfectly natural, normal and alert but is in
reality not conscious at all, but is rather some sort of automaton" (pp.
219-220). Malik claims that while
modern philosophy and science see us as one or the other, we are in fact
neither.

So far, Malik asserts, attempts to
define human nature have produced results that are neither helpful nor
convincing. According to Malik, "The
understanding of humans as simply animals or machines . . . is an illusion
fostered by a culture that is deeply pessimistic in its view of human beings." This pessimism is so pervasive and
ubiquitous that we don’t even notice it, and yet its tangible products cannot
be ignored. To be happy, to achieve
fulfilling, creative, productive and harmonious lives, to create social systems
that foster cooperation and tolerance, all of these worthy endeavors are far
more difficult and tenuous in times of global pessimism.

It
should be emphasized here that while he is concerned that human nature isn’t
currently getting its proper recognition and appropriate interpretation, Malik
is not at all antagonistic to the intent or methods of the scientific
enterprise; those who would look to his work for an ally in their battle
against science will be disappointed. 
Nor does he offer support for the post-modern notion of a subjective
reality, and radical constructivism would find no support in Malik’s work.

What
Malik does claim is that the scientific approaches used in the physical
sciences and in the study of non-human animals, cannot be used ‘as is’ in the
study of humans. Any scientific
approach to human nature, he emphasizes, cannot be understood apart from the
culture in which that science is generated. 
(However, readers will keep in mind the perils of a post-modern position
that in its most extreme form becomes surreal.)

And
as an example of how zeitgeist affects the scientific perception of
human nature, Malik notes that "Whereas nineteenth-century Darwinists saw
evolution as the story of the ascent of Man from his brutish origins, today’s
Darwinists want rather to tell the tale of the Fall of Man back into
beastliness" (p. 22).

Malik
disputes many fundamental positions of current evolutionists, including Dawkins’
suggestion that organisms are the agents by which genes replicate
themselves. Although he distinguishes
sociobiology from evolutionary psychology, Malik disagrees with both camps:

Sociobiology was a misguided attempt to apply
Darwinian theory to human behaviour because human activity cannot be understood
simply as a means of maximising reproductive fitness. Yet sociobiology possessed one priceless advantage: its claims
were about contemporary behaviour. Evolutionary psychology, on the other hand,
is a claim about the past. It argues that the mechanisms that give rise to
human behaviour were designed to increase fitness, not in today’s environment,
but that of fifty or a hundred thousand years ago. (p. 195).

The core of Malik’s disagreement
with these understandings of human nature is that both seem to place limits on
human agency. If, for example, we’re pre-programmed to respond to certain
stimuli in specific ways, what is there to say about free will? And without
true choice, how can we be held responsible for our actions?

Perhaps one of Malik’s most
compelling arguments rests on the differences between reasons and causes
as these relate to human decision-making and behavior. Animal behavior may be seen as caused
by instinct, but human behavior has reasons – – it involves
choices. Without that element of
choice, we can condone even the worst behavior by reference to nature. "If we accept scientific knowledge
about the workings of the human mind as an excuse for a person’s action, it is
only because we have chosen to view human beings in a particular way – as
objects rather than as subjects, as an animal or machine, rather than as a
human" (p. 383).

Most of us who subscribe to the
principles of evolutionary psychology would disagree that it curtails human
agency in any arena of life that matters. 
However, we have not done an especially good job yet of explaining how
it is that, if evolutionary forces have shaped our cognitive and emotional
processes, we are yet able to freely choose and freely direct our
behaviors. Malik demonstrates this
dilemma with a reference to Richard
Dawkins’ claim that we are the only species that can "rebel against
the tyranny" of our genes. Malik
notes that, "In his everyday life, Dawkins . . . believes in the
importance of human beings as conscious, rational agents. Yet his desire for a naturalistic
explanation of the world leads to a science that denies him the resources to
understand humans in this way" (p. 356).

The issues of free will and
determinism must be successfully resolved in any meaningful understanding of
human nature; Malik agrees with Dennett’s ironic observation that without
determinism, there can be no free will. 
(Although Dennett had not yet published Freedom
Evolves at the time Man Beast, and Zombie appeared, Malik has
since written his own very interesting review.)

Malik’s book presents the careful
reader with a mental feast with many courses – – the history of science and
philosophy as regards human nature, a summary of the positions of important
current thinkers, and a helpful challenge to those tenets of evolutionary
psychology that would benefit from more work. 
As the public becomes ever more excited by the prospects of a genetic
explanation for every aspect of human nature, Malik asks the reader to consider
the implications of this approach, and to keep in mind the uniqueness of our
species.

 

© 2003 Keith Harris 

Keith
Harris, Ph.D., is a clinical psychologist and supervises the research
section of the Department of Behavioral Health, San Bernardino County,
California. His interests include the empirical basis for psychotherapy
research (and its design), human decision-making processes, and the shaping of
human nature by evolutionary forces.

Categories: Psychology, Philosophical