"There are no objective
values." Thus begins J.L Mackie’s classic Ethics: Inventing Right and
Wrong (1977), in which metaethical error-theory was originally expounded.
Error-theory holds that although moral judgments appear to be about objective
matters (e.g. what is really valuable, what we really ought to do), there is no
good reason to believe that there are objective values, and so all moral
judgments are false because they fail to refer. In Metaethical Subjectivism,
Richard Double again makes the case for error-theory by focusing upon the
fragmentary character of our moral intuitions and the apparent impossibility of
corralling all of these intuitions into an objective normative ethical theory.
The best explanation of the disunity among our moral intuitions, according to
Double, is the metaphysical thesis that there are no objective values (or
obligations, or virtues), rather than the objectivist thesis which must
attribute the conflicting character of our moral judgments to cognitive error.
Morality is metaethically subjective, claims Double, which means that we need
only appeal to human psychology and feelings in order to explain the source of
our moral judgments; morality is our invention, not our discovery.

Double’s general strategy will
be familiar to readers of Mackie. Double demonstrates great energy in compiling
the evidence of conflicting moral intuitions in order to support what Mackie
called the argument from relativity against objective moral values. Since the
variety of subjectivism which both of these philosophers endorse is primarily a
negative thesis (i.e. a thesis about what there isn’t, viz. objective
moral values), the bulk of the argument is directed against metaethical
objectivism (which Double equates with moral realism). If objectivism fails,
Double (and Mackie) win by default. Double is careful to distinguish his
subjectivism from non-cognitivism (in Chapter 3), which he understands as a
semantic rather than metaphysical theory (that moral judgments express feelings
or approvals rather than truth-apt claims). Although he thinks that non-cognitivism
is a fair way to argue for subjectivism, he finds it unnecessary to delve into
semantics in order to establish his metaphysical thesis. How does Double do
this? He shows us that in the realm of moral values, obligations, and virtues,
"everything defeats everything" (Chapter 8).

Double argues that any objective
normative theory must satisfy the requirements of soundness and completeness
(Chapter 2). To satisfy soundness, such a theory must be non-fragmentary; that
is, the theory must provide the same kinds of answers wherever it is applied in
our moral reasoning, and it must not give conflicting answers to the question,
"What should I do?" in any given case. A sound theory should not be
open to obvious counterexample (as many believe both utilitarian and
deontological theories to be), and it should not endorse contradictory claims,
such as that one is both obligated and not obligated to perform a particular
act. To satisfy completeness, an objective normative theory would have to
provide a determinate answer in all cases. A theory can only claim to be
objective, argues Double, if it can serve as a consistent, stable, and
determinate guide for every moral case to which we apply it.

However, if Double is correct,
no normative theory can satisfy these requirements. Anyone familiar with
ethical theory has heard some standard objections to utilitarianism (that it
may be morally permissible to kill an innocent person to save the lives of
others), deontology (that it is absurd to tell the truth to someone who will
use that information to do great harm), and virtue ethics (that what counts as
a virtue in one society may seem monstrous in another society). Double’s
"everything defeats everything" argument (in Chapter 8) provides a
multitude of cases, each designed to show that one moral system trumps another
in that particular case. Ultimately, Double tries to show that every moral
system, value, or virtue seems to get some particular case right (thus
defeating the other approaches), but that none of our moral approaches gets all
the cases right, and that there are some cases in which it is entirely unclear
whether the emphasis of any value, system, or virtue will get the case right.
(Double calls these "cases in which I do not know what to say.") The
upshot of this barrage of cases and Double’s handling of them is that no
objective moral theory can legitimately claim to have satisfactory answers to
all of our possible moral problems.

In a similar spirit, Double
spends Chapters 5 and 6 showing that there are compelling arguments for both
the claim that any objective theory should endorse a principle of impartiality
and that any objective theory must (morally) allow room for some partiality
(e.g. special treatment of relatives or friends, etc.). Again, if Double’s
arguments are correct, then any objective moral theory must endorse
contradictory claims (i.e. it must be both partial and impartial).

Given all of the problems and
inconsistencies that stand in the way of objective moral theory, Double
believes that we should abandon objectivism and embrace his metaethical
subjectivism. Subjectivism can easily account for the fragmentary character of
our moral reasoning: we are raised in various cultures, are taught to emphasize
various values, and possess different temperaments and interests that incline
us to value differing goods. The subjectivist can accept the existence of
conflicting moral intuitions as well as the fact that we may reason from
different principle in different kinds of cases, and this need not, according
to Double, lead us to give up moral reasoning altogether and to embrace moral
nihilism or an "anything goes" view of morality (Chapter 9).
Subjectivism can, he thinks, teach us the useful lesson that our own system of
morality may not be the only viable system, and thus subjectivism may help to
loosen the grip of moral fanaticism on us. Furthermore, the view that there are
no objective values captures the phenomenology of our sense of conflict and
uncertainty when we are faced with a moral decision: we feel this way because
we are faced with choices to which there is no objective answer.

However, Double claims,
"If, after arguing for metaethical subjectivism, it occurred to me that
accepting my view would cause me to care less about treating individuals
morally or disable my thinking about broad moral principles, I would still
accept subjectivism. This is what it is to embrace Worldview metaphilosophy"
(109). Although Double (happily, he notes) does not think that subjectivism
leads to these consequences, he seems to think that it wouldn’t matter even if
subjectivism did deaden him to morality. It wouldn’t matter from the
perspective of his "metaphilosophy" which he calls the Worldview
approach, in which the primary goal of philosophy is to construct the best
possible theory of the world (see Chapter 1). If there are no objective values
according to our best possible (metaphysical) theory, then we must accept that
conclusion, come what may. But by attributing this attitude to the Worldview metaphilosophy,
which he contrasts with a Praxis metaphilosophy in which the main goal is to
guide human action and to improve the world, Double imports normative
considerations into his argument at a higher level, and these considerations
give shape to the entire course of his argument. Double accepts the often
questioned distinction between metaethics and normative ethics, and thus
believes that metaethical theorizing has no intrinsic connection with normative
theory (that is, that doing metaethics doesn’t involve making any substantive
moral or normative assumptions) (see 111). The problem is that Double’s metaphilosophy
transforms the goal of providing the best possible metaphysical theory (of
ethics and everything else) into an absolute value; Double claims that since metaphilosophies
flow from attitudes and desires, there is no basis for arguing for or against a
metaphilosophy: our desires cannot be true or false (see 9). Double’s desire to
locate in particular cases the fragmentation of value of which he seems
convinced leads him to overlook certain possibilities, such as that a more
robust moral pluralism is compatible with moral realism than he thinks
possible. (He briefly addresses pluralism in Chapter 2, 26-27.) Furthermore,
one may take issue with Double’s heavy reliance on his own moral intuitions in
order to adjudicate his many cases, or with his particular handling of some of
the cases. (For my part, I think he offers an unfair treatment of issues such
as integrity and the value of certain kinds of promises, even in the face of
conflicting duties.)

Metaethical Subjectivism
is written for philosophers working in ethics and requires a fair amount of
familiarity with the contemporary literature in this field. Although I, too, am
inclined toward a kind of subjectivism (a kind quite different than Double’s
error-theory), the moral seriousness with which we must decide what we should
do (of which Double partakes in his repeated emphasis that he does care about
answering the question, "What should I do?") seems to demand of us
that we look for some kind of objective basis for our moral judgments, even if
this foundation lacks the unity and pristine character which Double thinks
realist ethical theories must possess. If Double’s view about what an objective
normative theory must be like is incorrect, then the rest of his argument can
be called into question.

© 2006 Matthew Pianalto

Matthew Pianalto is a Ph.D.
candidate at the University of Arkansas. His webpage is http://comp.uark.edu/~mpianal.

Categories: Ethics, Philosophical