The
second half of the 20th century has been an exceptionally fertile period for
theories of justice. The number of positions, criticisms, and counter-positions
requires considerable time and effort to keep up with, let alone sort out. Kolm’s book, the fruit of twenty-five years of careful
scholarly work, is a compendious and fine-grained effort to do just such
sorting, as well as a coherent and complete presentation his own view of
‘rational justice’ or “justice as reasons in society.”

Justice
is concerned with the question, How should the
benefits and burdens of social cooperation be distributed among members of
society under conditions of scarcity and conflicting values? Or as Kolm’s out it: “What should be done when different people’s
desires or interests oppose one another and cannot all be fully satisfied?
Justice is the justified answer to this question and its science is the theory
of justice.”(3)

On Kolm’s account, justice is derived from considerations of
rationality. Justice cannot be defined by one principle or one set of a few
principles that is all encompassing that characterize recent most approaches to
providing a comprehensive theory justice like John Rawls’, Ronald Dworkin’s, or Robert Nozick’s.
Justice must be practicable, efficient and open to “second-best,” rather than
optimal or idealistic, solutions. Justice, on Kolm’s
view, has the general form of an equality of individuals’ liberties in a broad
sense, with different applications, and specific adjustments when several
liberties conflict or when everybody prefers another outcome. The real work of
justice theory starts not with justification of principles but of justifying
adjustments required in concrete situations or bridging macro justice and micro
justice. Solutions to the problems of micro justice cannot be “provided an a
priori explicit complete solution . . . its general considerations can only
consist of methods and a toolbox of specific principles and criteria.” (475)
However, if a macro theory of justice is defective either in terms of
rationality or economic efficiency, then it cannot provide the required
practical criteria to judge cases.

Kolm’s
theory of rational justice provides the framework through which he evaluates
completing justice theories in terms of principles, or criteria of justice: its
salient features and problems, how it compares with other theories, the
solutions it offers to social and distributive problems, and its main
consequences. Kolm shows how some theories complement
each other, how others are unworkable, and how others could be rescued by
adjusting principles or procedures. For example, he criticizes Rawls’ theory of
justice for a flawed ‘original position’ in which actors choose their
principles of distributing social goods without knowledge of their capacities
or social position for irrealism because all choices
are made with full knowledge of capacities, social position and social
possibilities. The “backbone”of Rawlsian
justice cannot be justified. “The theory of the Original
Position does not a priori and in general provide Rawls’ principles of justice”
(191). On Kolm’s account, Rawls theory can be
modified to allow knowledge of capacities and social position without changing
the moral substance of the theory. Thus, Kolm
concludes that ‘rational justice’ incorporates knowledge of social position
into the formation of the first principles of social justice without undoing
the moral significance of a liberal theory of justice.

The
book has a three part organization. the introduction
(chapters 1-3) and conclusion (chapter
16) that describe the basic concepts, properties, distinctions and methods of
justice. These chapters are particularly useful to those new to the literature.
The major part of the book is the critical assessment of theories (chapters 4-15).
These chapters take up act- and process-freedom; equalities, inequality, misery
and needs; liberty, morals and the state; contractarianism,
liberalism, and utilitarianisms and social choice. These chapters make heavy
demands on the reader because they are highly technical and presume not only
philosophical reasoning but also technical economic analysis and legal
reasoning. Many of Kolm’s key arguments depend on a
fine grained economic analysis of the practical consequences of theories if
they were operationalized.

One
of the most significant strengths of the book is that Kolm,
who is French, writes out of a continental tradition of justice-theory that is
often not heard in English philosophy. Some of his off-hand remarks are
discomforting and challenging. For example, he describes utilitarianism that
has dominated English-language thinking about justice, “the English fantasy” a
harbor of moral vices as well as moral virtue (187). His comparative position
is often insightful carefully showing how continental justice theories rests on
concepts of rights, liberties, equalities and solidaries
that are the bedrock of justice not concepts that require an a priori
justification as in most versions of English contractarianism
and utilitarianism do. He also helpful draws attention to significant new work
in justice theory by Europeans, especially French, thinkers
that opens new avenues of research for those interested in comparing
justice theories.

In
all Kolm’s arguments are well-framed and cogent. He
has masterful control of subject. However, critical turns in his arguments
reference prior work that is not available in English and out of print in
French. This is problematic given this was his first work in English. Even
though his book Justice and Equity (MIT, 2002) has been published in
English, this is not sufficient to follow out the complete development of his
arguments. Admittedly, Kolm does this for economy,
but there is need at critical junctures to have a better, more complete
development of particular arguments than Kolm
provides.

This
book is an intensive and intellectually demanding engagement with the general
theory of justice. It will be particularly useful to economists, public policy
specialists, lawyers, and philosophers. It is not an introduction to justice
theory and assumes the reader knows, and is not just acquainted with, the
theories he exhaustively considers. He provides no summaries or outlines of
theories, nor does he provide any ‘state of the debate,’ or consider the
secondary literature about these theories. Thus, it is not a work for anyone
without a generous background in justice theory and economics. Though for those
with the background, the book is worth the strenuous effort required to engage
it. Its perspective is refreshing. It provides sharp insights that provoke
thought, if not further research. His honest, disciplined criticism is helpful
and a substantial contribution to the literature.

© 2003 James Sauer

James
Sauer, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Philosophy, St. Mary’s University, San Antonia,Texas. He is author of
Faithful Ethics According to John Calvin: The Teachability
of the Heart (Edwin Mellen Press, 1997). He
is co-editor of the journal Philosophy in the Contemporary World, and
specializes in ethics, social philosophy, philosophy
of social science. His articles have appeared in the Personalist
Forum, Southwest Philosophy Review, Southwest Philosophical Studies, and
the Journal of Social Economics among others.

Categories: Philosophical, Ethics