Multiple
Analogies in Science and Philosophy is volume 11 of the Human Cognitive
Processing series.  As part of an
interdisciplinary book series that researches the nature of human thought,
language, and cognitive processes in relation to all human cognition, ranging
from formal and organized knowledge to the study of the domains of the
rational, the emotional, and the unconscious, Cameron Shelley takes up
analogical reasoning and its central role in the human and natural
sciences.  This book is an important
contribution to the logic of discovery and for understanding how hypotheses are
created.  Not only does it demonstrate
how analogies have been crucial for helping scientists come up with better
explanations and descriptions of phenomena but also in fields such as
archeology where analogies have helped construct hypothesis of ancient
societies and cultures.  Praise for this
book is well deserved for bringing to the forefront a neglected area of
research.

An analogy is
comparison where one object, called a source analog, is mapped or drawn in
relation with another object, called a target analog.  There are two types of analogies: single and multiple.  A single analogy compares a target analog
with a source analog.  A multiple
analogy compares more than one source analog with a target analog.  That is, a multiple analogy is a comparison
where a single target is likened to several source analogs.

What is an example
of a multiple analogy?  The most
striking example is unrelated to the theme that analogies have been crucial in
science or philosophy.  In the preface,
Shelley turns to an example found in politics with the Clinton/Lewinsky
scandal.  Lewinsky’s mother, Marcia
Lewis, had reportedly said the following about Linda Tripp:  "she is like a meddlesome witch, a
praying mantis".  This is a
multiple analogy.  The first source
analog, referring to Tripp as "meddlesome witch", expresses Lewis’
belief that Tripp uses situations and relations with people as a means to some
wicked ends.  The second source analog
compares Tripp to a praying mantis. 
Here, it seems that Lewis borrows the image of the praying mantis that
stands completely still and innocuous on a leaf waiting to ambush and catch
unsuspecting insects.  Lewis’ analogy,
while somewhat imperfect, expresses a situation where Lewinsky (here as the
passerby insect) did not see Tripp as a predator. 

Shelley argues that
multiple analogies have been central and vital in the history of philosophy as
well as in the development of the social and physical sciences.  Despite the prevalence and importance of
multiple analogies, they have not been subject to much investigation and
study.  The inner logic of analogical
inference functions remains shrouded and veiled.  The reason for this neglect is that most theorists have assumed
that a multiple analogy is a form of a single analogy.  So in place of this, Shelley offers a new
direction whereby the study of analogical reasoning cannot be limited to single
analogies and must be studied on its own.

The text builds on a
recent theory of analogies called the shared structure theory and uses it as a
framework to investigate real examples in evolutionary biology, archaeology and
philosophy.  The shared structure theory
claims that analogies are comparisons of casual or higher-order
relationships.  If there are two
analogs, A and B, then there is a mapping between the two sets of predicates, A
and B.  These analogs are mapped or
aligned as source and target analogs. 
Shelley clarifies that there is not mapping between attributes.  Rather, there is mapping between relations
where source and target analogs enter into a system of relations.  In other words, there is a higher order
relation between source and target analogs, often in a causal relationship.

While praise is
deserved for this highly technical examination of the logic of multiple
analogies, there are also problems with the text, specifically because its
approach and method limits its scope and vision.  In focusing on the successful use of multiple analogies in these
particular academic fields, the reader is directed to the singular conclusion
that analogies are used in human cognition solely because of their success in
fostering better descriptions of phenomena and for the creation of theories.  While this is accurate to say that analogies
have been used successfully in science and philosophy, this is only one element
to a more comprehensive statement of why human cognition uses analogical
inference.  That is, analogies seem to
indicate something structurally about human cognition and about the nature of
reason itself.  But the question of what
does analogical reasoning suggests about reason and thinking is left unasked.  As to what this answer might be, the
reviewer of this book has no answers. 
However, the problem is that Shelley denies the very possibility for
considering larger questions like this one. 
While the logic of how multiple analogies function is at the forefront
of the book, there are important issues that are not addressed.

© 2005 Robert Ramos

Robert Ramos, M.A.
Candidate in Philosophy at the New School for Social Research

Categories: Philosophical