The sixth volume of the Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility draws together a variety of interesting and engaging papers dealing with a broad scope of relevant topics within the current philosophical literature on agency and responsibility. This collection of fascinating articles discusses issues and ideas with clear relevance to not just professional philosophers but also social workers, legal theorists, researchers, ethicists, and the general public. The book consists of eleven papers discussing topics such as modern threats to moral responsibility, the relationship between poverty and self-control, blaming individuals for collective actions, and a critical discussion of volitional control as it pertains to moral accountability. David Shoemaker introduces this edition of the Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility and gives an excellent summary of each of the papers. 

In the first chapter titled Control, Attitudes, and Accountability, Douglas Portmore argues we need to adopt a new form of control in order to maintain the idea that people can be held accountable for their reason-responsive attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. The reason for this is the problem that the standard version of control – volitional control – has with accounting for our reason-responsive attitudes. Portmore proposes rational control as the relevant sort of control for moral accountability, and explains an agent possesses such control when their attitudes and intentions are receptive to reasons. 

Jeanette Kennett and Jessica Wolfendale, in the second chapter, discuss the problematic standard perception of the self-control of those persons experiencing poverty and racism: Self-Control and Moral Security. Kennett and Wolfendale argue that moral security is a fundamental part of agency and that certain groups in society undermine the moral security of vulnerable people. Many disadvantages suffered by those who are impoverished or addicted are attributed to the victim as a result of poor self-control. The authors analyse how these sorts of narratives influence and undermine the moral security of individuals by discussing the nature of self-control and how moral security, and then in turn agency, is undermined. 

The third chapter, titled (En)joining Others, aims to clarify the relationship between individual agency and joint agency as it pertains to responsibility. Specifically, Eric Wiland discusses cases where one agent performs an action while another agent directed them to do so and then investigates how we should conceive of the responsibility and agency involved, arguing that in such cases we have joint agency and shared responsibility between the agents. 

Next, in Who’s Afraid of a Little Resentment?, Angela Smith criticises the distinction between moral responsibility in the attributability sense and moral responsibility in the accountability sense. The standard view is that certain agents are not apt for accountability-responses (such as resentment) due to them not having certain emotional or cognitive capacities or because the agent cannot understand such responses (such as people with mental disabilities or psychopaths), viewing such agents as only being responsible in the attributability sense. Smith challenges these claims and argues that these criteria do not excuse agents like this from blame in the accountability sense. The result is doubt about either the exclusion of agents generally considered immune to punishment or doubt about justified moral desert in general. 

In the fifth chapter, Shame and Attributability, Andreas Brekke Carlsson aims to clarify the distinction between attributability and accountability by focusing on different types of self-blame as the distinguishing feature. Carlsson argues that the defining type of self-blame for accountability is deserving of feeling guilt, while for attributability it is the fittingness of shame. Although both types of self-blame entail suffering or at least the potential for pain, it is only blame in the accountability sense that holds the agent is deserving of suffering (of guilt), while attributability only entails that it is fitting for the agent to feel shame for what they did. 

Aiming to conceptualise the nature of blaming in the attributability sense while dealing with problematic cases of agency, August Gorman in The Minimal Approval Account of Attributability argues that the best way to determine moral blame in the attributability sense is to see if the agent would give at least partial and hypothetical approval of a motivational state executed in action. Gorman holds that this view of attributive responsibility is able to account for otherwise problematic cases such as actions caused by unconscious desires or explaining why some emotions are attributable while others are not. 

Following this, in chapter seven, titled Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far, Elizabeth Harman draws our attention to the limits of moral testimony as justification for false moral beliefs, thereby arguing that moral testimony cannot render a person blameless should the information they were given turn out to be erroneous. The reason for the discussion is the widely accepted principle that should someone do something that is generally considered morally wrong, but they only did it because they had a justified false belief about the factual circumstances, they can be judged as blameless. Harmann proposes that moral testimony, even that of moral authorities, can never provide justification for a false moral belief and so never exculpates the agent from moral blame. 

Michael S. Moore in Contemporary Neuroscience’s Epiphenomenal Challenge to Responsibility takes on the rather popular opinion that certain results from modern neuroscience have demonstrated a threat to moral responsibility by seemingly showing that agents are not the ultimate cause of their wills. Studies seem to show that our experience of willing (traditionally thought of as us “controlling”) and the effect of that willing (our actions) are the results of certain brain activities which occur without our control. Moore argues for a distinction between causation and control, arguing that although some results might show that we are not the cause of certain occurrences, we can still have control of them and thus be responsible. 

The ninth chapter brings to light an often overlooked argument in normative ethics between actualists and possibilists. Actualists hold that people ought to do the best that they actually can and will, while possibilists hold that people ought to do the best possible set of actions available. Travis Timmerman and Philip Swenson introduce the reader to the distinction between actualism and possibilism in How to Be an Actualist and Blame People where they attempt to provide a solution to some problems that have been proposed for actualism. At the end of the paper, Timmerman and Svenson also present a new challenge to possibilism. 

In chapter ten, Between Strict Liability and Blameworthy Quality of Will, Elinor Mason argues that agents might have reasons to be blameworthy even in cases where the action is not the result of poor will or ill intentions, but where the agent is still minimally at fault. An example of one such case would be losing your friend’s necklace by accident; you did not do this because of your poor quality of will or because you were misbehaving (at least in the examples provided). The reason for her discussion is the commonly accepted principle of control that states agents cannot be held morally responsible for actions not under their control (such as the accident mentioned above). Mason argues in such cases that agents have certain responsibilities due to the nature of their relationships with others; sometimes, blameworthiness is the result of focusing outside the self and taking ownership of our actions as they pertain to others out of respect, as well as to secure trust. 

The final chapter by Matt King, titled Scepticism about the Standing to Blame, addresses the common reasons given for why particular agents do not have the standing to blame others due to some feature of their own – such as being hypocritical or meddlesome. King criticises several typical candidates for what such a standing might be (a right, claim, entitlement, immunity, or privilege) and argues they all fail to account for the given examples. Following this, King argues these forms of blaming are inappropriate because they violate various moral norms that pertain to how we interact with others. 

The sixth volume of the Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a fantastic addition to the philosophical literature and a vital tool for academics. The general tone and writing style of the papers are accessible and should be enjoyable for the general reader. Some papers such as Contemporary Neuroscience’s Epiphenomenal Challenge to Responsibility and How to Be an Actualist and Blame People are slightly more technical than the others and require a familiarity with philosophical jargon, but these are the exception. Self-Control and Moral Security, Who’s Afraid of a Little Resentment?, and Between Strict Liability and Blameworthy Quality of Will, all have clear relevance to counsellors, therapists, and legal theorists. Each deals with essential questions about what agents are really to blame for and what they “deserve”. Researchers in moral psychology and legal theory might find interest in Contemporary Neuroscience’s Epiphenomenal Challenge to Responsibility, (En)joining Others, and Scepticism about the Standing to Blame, as they discuss important concepts such as volition (important for discussions of willful intent – mens rea in criminal law), collective responsibility, and the conditions required to blame others. All the papers are valuable additions to their respective topics and have clear significance to the discussions within philosophy as well as relevance to the general public and everyday life. Every reader can expect to learn something new or to challenge an idea – an enjoyable and fascinating read. 

 

Ivan Bock has a Masters degree in philosophy from Stellenbosch University. He specialises in epistemology, moral philosophy, and metaphysics. He writes a general philosophy blog at ivanbock.wordpress.com

Categories: Philosophical, Ethics

Keywords: Agency, Responsibility, Philosophy, Ethics