Uriah Kriegel’s “Phenomenal Intentionality” is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on the systematic interrelation between consciousness — phenomenal consciousness in particular — and intentionality. I think that Kriegel’s volume will advance the discussion in analytic philosophy in providing not only a carefully put together collection of papers bringing together many major figures in the debate concerning phenomenal intentionality, but also by providing the outlines of a research program for phenomenal intentionality as a take on the problem of intentionality and its relation to the consciousness. In the following review, I will lay emphasis on Kriegel’s exposition of this research program — mainly because of the fact that I want to draw attention to phenomenal intentionality as a whole. Nevertheless, I would like to add that I find all of the papers of this volume insightful as well as carefully put together.

The first section of the volume consists of an introduction to what Kriegel calls “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program” (abbreviated PIRP). Kriegel’s introduction differs in a very refreshing way from typical introductions to volumes of this kind: it offers a systematic exposition of the central conceptual hallmarks and philosophical characteristics of “Phenomenal Intentionality” as a research program. In order to give the readers of this review a detailed perspective on PIRP, I will provide a rather long summary of this opening chapter.

Kriegel’s “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program” (1-26) takes its leave from a negative definition of PIRP: in contrast to the “naturalist-externalist research program” (NERP), proponents of PIRP claim that consciousness — and in particular phenomenal consciousness — is essential in the formation of intentionality. This fundamental characterization of PIRP can be spelled out along the lines of five different concepts that are important for PIRP:

(1) First, there is the feature of “phenomenal grounding” which implies that there is — in an ontologically robust way — intentionality grounded in phenomenal properties. Kriegel calls this “phenomenal intentionality”. Kriegel goes on to specify the character of phenomenal intentionality: He argues that phenomenal intentionality is (1-a) “distinct” in the sense that there are certain characteristics of phenomenal intentionality that are not exemplified by any other form of intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality is (1-b) “narrow” in the sense that is not dependent on anything exterior to the respective experiencing subject. Last but not least, phenomenal intentionality is (1-c) “subjective” in the sense that is always an intentional experience for someone. The second and the third feature of PIRP generalize the account of phenomenal intentionality given above. Kriegel argues (2) for “inseparatism” – the idea that the category of the phenomenal and the category of the intentional do not form two separate categories. And Kriegel argues (3) for the “basicness” of phenomenal intentionality — the idea that all other forms of intentionality are derived from phenomenal intentionality.

At the end of the day, this means that phenomenal intentionality is a distinct, narrow and subjective kind of intentionality which is grounded in phenomenal properties is the basic kind of intentionality from which all other forms are derived.

With this definition at hand, Kriegel now turns to four issues on which the proponents of PIRP could take different stances: (A) What is the ontology of the relation holding between phenomenal properties and fundamental intentional properties? (B) To what extent is there phenomenal intentionality? (C) Do phenomenal intentional states have derived intentionality supplementing their non-derived fundamental intentional properties? (D) Can phenomenal intentionality be naturalistically localized? These question allow for a classification of the different philosophical approaches that have been developed by proponents of PIRP.

Let me take one minute to reflect on Kriegel’s exposition of PIRP and his definition of phenomenal intentionality. I think that his introduction to the research program is a very important contribution to PIRP. Not only does it provide a very concise definition of PIRP and phenomenal intentionality which will help people interested in the debate and critics from the NERP camp to get a conceptual grip on PIRP. But it will also help to clarify discussion with PIRP because proponents are able to provide a more clear-cut classification of their own position along the lines of the characteristics (1) to (3) and the systematic question (A) to (D).

The following sections of Kriegel’s contribution are dedicated to explaining various argumentative strategies that have been put forth in order to argue in favor of PIRP. The first set of arguments explores various strategies to argue for the existence of phenomenal intentionality (7-8). The second set of arguments explores the question in what systems und what circumstances phenomenal intentionality occurs in the natural world (8-10). The third of arguments explores the question in what sense phenomenal intentionality is something unique which can differ from other forms of intentionality (10-13). Finally, Kriegel arrives at the central hypothesis proposed by PIRP: …

“… phenomenal intentionality is in some way basic among forms of intentionality … .” (13)

He discusses four versions of the claim that phenomenal intentionality is “basic”: The strongest claim for the basicness of phenomenal intentionality has been defended by people like Galen Strawson: They argue that there is no non-phenomenal intentionality in the world. This strong ontological interpretation set aside, there are three versions of basic phenomenal intentionality construing basicness as a certain kind of dependence-relation: McGinn and Kriegel claim that all intentionality must be derived from phenomenal intentionality. Searle defends the slightly weaker assertion that all intentionality must be derived from at least potentially phenomenal intentional states. Last but not least, the weakest claim is put forth by Horgan and others: they argue that all intentionality must be derived from intentionality that is appropriately related to phenomenal intentionality (13-17).

The following eleven contributions to this volume explore the scope and extent of PIRP from different angles and perspectives. Due to the length of this review, I will be able to give only a few ideas on the scope and question addressed in each of the papers: In her paper, “The Access Problem” (27-48) Michelle Montague addresses the problem that mental states have proper access to the very objects they are about. She rejects pure externalism — proposing a version of internalism, which she calls the “Matching View”.

David Pitt’s “Indexical Thoughts” (49-70) is concerned with the question whether indexical thoughts are dependent upon the object they address or if they purely dependent upon the subject entertaining this thought. He defends an internalist and phenomenalist account of indexical thoughts.

Christopher Frey addresses the problem of “Phenomenal Presence” (71-92). He defends the idea that the representational characteristics of experience are not sufficient to ground phenomenal presence. Rather a minimal concept combining both phenomenal experience and representational features, which he calls experiential intentionality, is needed to provide a basis for phenomenal presence (which is itself not representational in a strict sense).

Colin McGinn’s contribution “Consciousness and Synthesis” (93-98) contests Brentano’s idea the “intentionality is the mark of the mental”. He argues that “synthetic” intentionality, which combines other more primitive states of intentionality is the essential characteristic of the conscious mind.

In her “Constructing a World for the Senses” (99-115), Katalin Farkas supports one specific reading of phenomenal intentionality: She argues that simple sensory experiences may well not represent anything other than themselves. Yet, in coordination and complex structure, says Farkas, those simples experiences might indicate something beyond those very experiences — the experience-independent world of objects.

Farid Masrour defends a Kantian interpretation of phenomenal objectivity in his “Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality” (116-136).

Frederick Kroon discusses “The Role of Intentional Objects” (137-155) between the phenomenal intentionalist’s interpretation of intentionality on the one hand and the intentional realist’s interpretation on the other hand. At the end of the day, “the chapter offers a compromise fictionalist approach that fits the spirit of the phenomenal intentionalist framework while retaining the benefits of the intentional realists of invoking intentional objects.” (139)

Tim Crane’s contribution “Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought” (156-173) tackles the question whether there is a distinctive kind of phenomenal intentionality associated with conscious thought: Crane explores — in order to make the idea of conscious thought as exemplifying a distinct kind of phenomenal intentionality — the structure of conscious thinking discussing critically various approaches.

In his “Intellectual Gestalts” (174-193), Elijah Chudnoff takes a stance on the problem of phenomenal character that is influenced by classical phenomenology — and in particular by findings of Gestalt psychology. He argues in favor phenomenal holism — the thesis that “some phenomenal characters can be only instantiated by experiences that are art of certain wholes.” (175)

Adam Pautz explores the question whether cognitive phenomenology helps to ground mental content. Although his initial assessment of this question is negative, he argues that refined version of the question might prove more promising: in his “Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?” (194-234) the thesis is defended that is not cognitive phenomenology but sensory phenomenology that ground intentionality.

Charles Siewert takes on of the main problems that have been voiced against the so called “Higher Order Theories” of consciousness: the regress problem. Taking the worry of an infinite regress of higher order states serious, Siewert’s “Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness” (235-260) argues that phenomenality cannot be reduced to representation — even self-representation. Rather certain forms of self-consciousness should be understood as instances of phenomenality.

At the very end of his contribution to this inspiring and thought-provoking volume, Uriah Kriegel has outlined his own perspective on the development of PIRP and its relation to the traditions in analytic philosophy of mind:

“Work on intentionality within analytic philosophy of mind has been dominated for the past four decades by the idea that intentionality comes into the world when a certain type of tracking relation appears. In the last decade or so, however another approach has been gaining momentum, suggesting that it is rather the appearance of a certain type of phenomenal character that injects intentionality into the world. From and around this newer approach a cluster of observations, contentions, and debates has emerged that has enlivened philosophical discussions of the mind to take a fresh look at the phenomenon of intentionality.” (21)

Personally, I wholeheartedly agree with this observation and I consider this volume an important contribution to this (necessary and in some sense overdue) “fresh look on the phenomenon of intentionality”.

 

© 2013 Ludwig Jaskolla

 

Ludwig Jaskolla is working at the Munich School of Philosophy, Germany. He specializes in analytic metaphysics and philosophy of mind.