The revised edition of David Braddon-Mitchell's and Frank Jackson's Philosophy of Mind and Cognition contains a substantive amount of new material, including several expanded discussions of such topics as dualism, the autonomy of psychology, the knowledge argument, physicalism, the map-system account of belief, and causal theories of reference. Perhaps the most significant changes are a dedicated section evaluating the philosophical notion of zombies, a wholly new section outlining and assessing representationalist accounts of experience, and an additional chapter on the difficult topic of connectionism.

Remaining unchanged are a number of useful features to help guide the reader, such as annotated reading-lists, a comprehensive glossary, marginalia, and asterisks indicating more demanding passages, all of which make for a very user-friendly and accessible text. Also unchanged are the authors' judicious judgments as to which issues to cover. Among those discussed are the principal theories of the mind and its relation to the body (dualism, behaviorism, the identity theory, functionalism), the central mental phenomena that such theories aim to incorporate and explain (mental content, qualia, mental causation), and the prominent irrealist positions (instrumentalism, interpretationism, eliminativism). These topics are outlined in an eminently accessible way and the foremost problems each is thought to face or pose are addressed with authority and, perhaps most importantly for an introductory text, utmost clarity.

The book provides an unabashedly opinionated introduction. Specifically, its authors support the view that 'a certain kind of functionalism is the best candidate for a philosophical theory of the mind' (p. x). Ultimately, one might not agree with this judgment or their arguments in support of it (I, for one, do not) but the authors' partisan approach is stimulating rather than intimidating, and ought to provoke rather than stifle critical responses from their audience.

Unfortunately, while the detailed chapter on connectionism is especially welcome, not all the revisions are wholly successful. The section dedicated to discussing zombies — putatively conceivable creatures that 'walk and talk like real people, but lack qualia or conscious experience' (p. 123) — seems strangely placed. It occurs at the close of a chapter whose focus, according to the authors, 'will be restricted to challenges for functionalism about mental states like belief and desire, and mental traits like intelligence', rather than 'the difficult question of feeling and consciousness' (p. 109). It is not until the next chapter that the notion of qualia is itself explained in any detail. Hence, the ordering of topics here might prove an obstacle for those new to such debates.

Composition aside, some of the new material is rather too cursory. In particular, representationalism — the 'view that the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by how it represents things to be' (p. 306) — is outlined very swiftly, and a series of challenges to it and rejoinders are raised in quick succession, with sometimes only a sentence given to each. A more detailed sketch and sustained discussion would surely have been preferable. Most notable is the respect in which 'disjunctivism' — the denial of a 'common element to veridical and illusory perceptual experience' (p. 152) — is introduced and passed over so hastily that it is doubtful that much could be learned from its mention.

Likewise, the 'expanded' discussion of the radical autonomy thesis — the 'view that the laws of psychology cannot be derived from the laws of the physical sciences' (p. 293) — is far too brief. The authors introduce the view as based on the idea that

the assignment of psychological properties answers to different constraints from the assignments of physical properties, including constraints of rationality that have no counterpart in the physical picture of what our world is like or in theorizing distinctive of the physical sciences. (p. 289)

Having raised the point, with which they presumably disagree, they (uncharacteristically) leave it wholly unresolved and do not discuss it any further. (Notably, Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson do not even connect it to their earlier discussion of interpretationism, which includes a critical response to the related (though distinct) idea that the principles of rationality are 'uncodifiable' (pp. 165-166)).

In addition to these concerns about the revised material, an important topic seems to have been omitted, namely simulationism. According to simulationism — as advanced by Alvin Goldmam, Robert Gordon, and Jane Heal — psychological explanation does not involve postulating internal states, governed by law-like generalizations of which we have tacit knowledge, as causes of behavior. Rather, it involves placing oneself in the position of the subject and imagining what one would (for example) believe in her situation, perhaps by running one's own belief-forming mechanisms 'off-line'.

Simulationism should have been discussed, not only because it is a view of independent interest widely-discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind, but most of all because it appears to constitute a direct challenge to the picture of psychological explanation that Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson champion, and upon which much of their discussion is premised. They openly endorse the view that 'beliefs and desires are posits of a causal-explanatory theory of behavior' (p. 268), that the 'folk' have 'an implicit mastery of a detailed and complex scheme that interconnects inputs, outputs, and mental states' (p. 63). These ideas guide and inform their remarks on rival theories of the mind, mental content and irrealism. Hence, introducing an addressing a prominent perspective that challenges such ideas would surely have been worthwhile.

It should be stressed, however, that the reservations expressed above are not intended to cast doubt on the fact that Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson have brought up-to-date an excellent introduction to issues at the centre of contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology. The book is readable, written with evident expertise, comprehensive in its coverage and consistently challenging. As such, the new edition remains an ideal course-text for upper-level undergraduate courses and should equally provide an indispensable resource for researchers.

 

© 2007 Daniel Whiting

 

Daniel Whiting, PhD, is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading. He specializes in the Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Mind.

Categories: Philosophical