Among contemporary analytic philosophers
of mind, cognitive scientists, and neurophysiologists, physicalism is
all the rage.  For the past thirty years, physicalism — the view that
everything there is, including human minds, is ultimately and exclusively
composed of physical constituents — has been (and continues to be) the
dominant paradigm in discussions of what Shopenhauer purportedly described as a
"world-knot" (Weltknoten), the so-called "mind-body
problem."  Historically, the mind-body problem represents Descartes’
legacy.  How can two fundamentally different substances (i.e., mind and body) causally
interact?   Of course, physicalists do not have Descartes’ problem.  Yet,
discussions of the mind-body problem during the past three decades reveal that
physicalism about the mind does have problems of its own.  Among these
is the problem of mental causation.  It is a problem that one prominent
philosopher of mind has called, "our mind-body problem" the
problem of "finding a place for mind in a world that is fundamentally
physical."  If everything is ultimately and exclusively physical, then how
can anything mental be causally efficacious?

Physicalism and Mental
Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action by Sven Walter and Heinz-Deiter
Heckmann (editors), represents an important contribution in the continuing
effort among physicalists to unravel the Weltknoten of mental
causation.  The book is a collection of new essays (totaling just under
350 pages) by leading scholars in analytic metaphysics and philosophy of mind,
notably: John Heil, Carl Gillett, Gene Witmer, E.J. Lowe, Andrew Melnyk, Ausonio
Marras, and Terrence Horgan.  The essays cover a range of recent, technical
philosophical issues falling broadly within four different areas (each area
corresponding to one of the four parts of this volume). 

The essays in Part I tackle
issues related to the nature of physicalism itself and the relations between
basic or fundamental physical constituents and the novel properties to which
they might give rise (e.g., realization and supervenience).   Part II includes
essays that address the relation between two important concepts frequently
discussed in recent philosophical literature: the notion of causal overdetermination
and the principle of causal closure.  Part III contains a set of essays devoted
to the so-called "problem of causal/explanatory exclusion" — a
recent problem articulated and developed by a leading physicalist philosopher, Jaegwon
Kim.  The essays in Part IV focus on how mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires)
can be causally effective in the production of human action within a physicalist
framework. 

Each of the essays in this volume
is philosophically rigorous and technically sophisticated.  For this reason, an
adequate (much less extensive!) engagement with its content is virtually
impossible in a review of reasonable length.  A thorough evaluation of this
volume would require another book, if not several.  Nonetheless, I feel obliged
to report a minor disappointment for which this volume is admittedly only
partly responsible.  In the preface, Walter and Heckmann correctly point out
that physicalists need to get "ontologically serious,"
otherwise "we [physicalists] are building sophisticated castles in the air"
(p. vi).  Such seriousness would be characterized by comprehensive and
systematic explanations of such concepts as causation, property, realization,
and physical.  In their words, "A comprehensive philosophical reflection
on the various metaphysical key notions and how they relate to the more
specific problems physicalism attempts to solve is thus a much needed
philosophical desideratum" (pp. vi-vii).  As one entrenched in this arena
of philosophy I could not agree more.  Yet, while this collection takes many significant
steps in that direction, the steps are unsystematic and in places disparate —
a weakness endemic to such anthologies.  Thus, for all of their independent
virtues, the essays in this collection, as a whole, contribute to a vice of
which the editors ironically seem aware — the lack of a common conceptual
framework in the ever-burgeoning literature on physicalism and mental
causation.  The result is a conversation in which participants speak past
and not with each other. 

Still, the fact that Walter and Heckmann
have put together a collection requiring such careful consideration is not only
a credit to its richness, but also will undoubtedly make it a significant
contribution to current analytic philosophy of mind.  However, readers
unfamiliar with this particular aspect of the philosophical landscape or
readers who lack a substantial degree of philosophical training may find the
excruciating complexity a bit taxing.  At the same time, Walter and Heckmann have
done a masterful job summarizing the book’s content through introductions at
the beginning of each section.  Moreover, each introduction includes a concise
and remarkably accurate synopsis for each essay within the section itself.  This
collection is an essential volume for the libraries of professional
philosophers and graduate students working analytic metaphysics or philosophy
of mind.

© 2003 Justin Barnard

Justin D. Barnard, Ph.D. is a
Lecturer in Philosophy at Messiah College.  His research interests include
metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion.

Categories: Philosophical