Honderich’s theory of
consciousness, as briefly expounded in this volume, attempts a paradigm shift
in favor of a strongly intuitive reading of what it is to be conscious. Consciousness,
according to Honderich, ‘is such that there is nothing in it or to it that you
do not have‘ (p. 4) or, to appeal directly to the intuition motivating
this statement, there can be nothing clearer to you than the conscious
experience you are having right now as you read this (web) page (to recycle an
example which appears in the volume) because ‘with respect to consciousness, there
is no difference between appearance and reality‘ (p.5). Why is this view
radical? Well, in part Honderich’s view is radical because he actively rejects
most, if not all, of the standard philosophical positions regarding
consciousness. First, he rejects the notion that perception is actually
content, and that the content has some corresponding container or vehicle (i.e.
there is no content of consciousness); second, he dismisses the impression of a
mind or self within consciousness, referencing Hume’s point that we cannot be
aware of such things; finally, he quashes talk of intentionality, denying that
there is any relationship of ‘aboutness’ within consciousness. In short, for
Honderich, consciousness is ‘perceptual, reflective and affective’ (p. 6), and,
in some sense, it is reliant both on us and actual states of affairs obtaining
in the world.

With a favorable reading Honderich’s
common sense theory appears to be the thesis that: when it comes to
consciousness what you see is, basically, what you get. However, he does draw a
distinction between the perceptual world and the physical world, in a bid to
retain another strong, common sense, intuition about the subjectivity of
consciousness. The physical world is defined to consist, broadly speaking, in two
categories, both of which exist in space and time: i) things that have
properties that are distinct from other properties that rely on perceivers, and
ii) things that are without distinct properties, but which stand in a causal
relation to the things picked out by the first category. So, to put this into
some context, take your perception of this (web) page, factor in the
proposition about there being no difference between appearance and reality, and
we can then say that your perceptual consciousness is a) something in space and
time, b) something with various properties, c) dependent on science (or a
noumenal world), and d) depending on you neurally. Perceptions, or perceptual
objects as they appear in consciousness, depend on actual objects in the
physical world: on the properties, such as color, of those objects; on the
constituents, such as atoms, that make up those objects; and on some necessary
condition obtaining within our brains. There is a strong sense, then, in which
Honderich’s theory takes consciousness outside the head — thus his theory can,
and is, characterized by the motto ‘Consciousness as Existence‘ (p. 8)
— by conceptually revising what we mean by consciousness, and arguing that
perceptual consciousness consists in external states of affairs, hence the
externalism in Radical Externalism.

The book presents various
criticisms of Honderich’s theory by a range of interesting philosophers who
have written on consciousness; these include Harold Brown, Tim Crane, James
Garvey, Stephen Law, E.J. Lowe, Derek Matravers, Paul Noordhof, Ingmar Persson,
Stephen Priest, Barry C Smith and Paul Snowdown. Each critique is followed be a
response from Honderich — although it must be said that some are far more
satisfactory than others. Although I do not have room here to go through each
critique and its corresponding response, there are certain general themes
picked out by a number of the respondents, a selection of which I present
below.

The central claim that seems to
spawn the most criticism is the claim that appearance is reality, or that consciousness
is existence, and the distinction between the physical world and the world of
perceptions. Stephen Law challenges Honderich to explain why his theory does
not lead to epiphenomenalism, and questions what impact the world of perceptual
consciousness can have causally on the physical world. Harold Brown questions
why, if perceptual objects exist in space and time, but aren’t part of the
physical world, the theory is not a contemporary form of either idealism or a
sense datum theory. James Garvey points out that, in one of the rare places
where Hume and Kant agree, existence adds nothing to concepts, and if the
theory is that ‘consciousness is existence’ then we aren’t really saying
anything about consciousness. E.J. Lowe makes a similar point to Brown, and
questions whether radical externalism is committed to the famous idealist
thesis ‘esse est percipi’, challenges the use of externalism in the thesis, and
again questions the causal efficacy of Honderich’s world of perceptions. Finally
(in my review, not in the actual book) Paul Noordhof also picks up on this
problem of causal efficacy, but furthermore defends a version of
representationalism against Honderich’s conceptual revolution, and argues that
radical externalism is less well supported that a disjunctivist
alternative.     

Honderich’s view is certainly new,
and definitely radical. However, his theory of radical externalism is not
presented in particular detail in this volume, which, by his own admission, favors
brevity and informality over diligent exposition (see On Consciousness,
2004, for a more in-depth explanation). But, if Noordhof is correct in his
assertion that ‘it is the fate of stimulating, provocative and
paradigm-shifting theories to be criticized’, then many of Honderich’s responses
should, perhaps, have addressed the issues in more depth, as this volume leaves
the theory looking far weaker than it may actually be. The problem of
consciousness in general remains a thorny problem, despite a huge amount of
discussion and development, and while Honderich’s theory certainly sparks
discussion, as the volume attests, the defense therein is, at times,
grammatically difficult to follow and leaves many of the criticisms unanswered.
On the positive side Honderich’s theory is clearly stated, with simple links to
well exposed, and well founded, intuitions. But, the sections which respond to
critics of his position are often informal to the point of incoherence, and,
for this reviewer at least, often lack force. Stylistically the criticisms are
far better than the replies, which is unfortunate as the lack of punctuation,
grammatical oddities and typos contained in the responses (although
interestingly not in the initial paper, so perhaps down to the copy editor) are
significant enough to be frustrating, and detract from their philosophical
content.

While the motivation behind this
volume is commendable, I found the contrast in quality between the critiques
and the responses stark and vexing. The panel of respondents is, in my view,
the saving grace of this book, and while I am enthusiastically interested in
consciousness, and generally both receptive and sympathetic to new and
interesting theories, I think that Honderich’s exposition and defense of his
own theory is greatly disadvantaged by the treatment it receives here. Radical
Externalism, at least as presented in this volume, is not convincing, and, in
light of numerous criticisms, is in serious need of a robust and decent defense.

© 2007 Nigel Leary

Nigel
Leary is currently studying for a PhD at the University of Birmingham, working on the AHRC funded Metaphysics of Science Project. Broadly speaking his
area of research is Natural Kinds as they appears both in post-Kripkean
philosophy of language and in recent work in the philosophy of science and the
metaphysics of laws. More specifically his research is focused on a metaphysics
of mind question of whether Natural Kinds can be applied in any useful fashion
to the problem of mental causation, and his intention is to argue that the
mental can be causally efficacious.

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology