Rationality and Freedom is the first of two volumes
for a larger project by Amartya Sen dealing with the subjects of rationality,
freedom, and justice.  A companion
volume, entitled Freedom and Justice, dealing with practical reason and
reasons for justice will be forthcoming.

The book, divided into six parts, is a
critical investigation of the concepts of rationality and freedom as they
pertain to the disciplines of philosophy and the social sciences, such as
economics — particularly the implications of these concepts for social
choice.  Some of the essays on this
volume have been previously published, others are new, and many of have been
presented publicly (such as his 1991 Kenneth Arrow Lectures and his 1998 Nobel
Prize Lecture).  At over 700 pages in
length, it would be impossible to adequately deal with all of the important,
intricate, and interesting ideas developed in this book.  Instead, I have decided to briefly examine
the most central aspect of Sen’s project: rationality and its reciprocal
relationship with freedom.

Sen defines rationality as the
‘discipline of subjecting one’s choices — of actions as well as objectives,
values, and priorities — to reasoned scrutiny.  Rather than defining rationality in terms of some formulaic
conditions… such as satisfying some prespecified axioms of "internal
consistence of choice"… rationality is seen here in much more general
terms as the need to subject one’s choices to the demands of reason’ (4).  This may seem an uncontroversial
characterization, but it involves more. 
Sen’s approach seeks to reject views of rationality that require
conforming to a set of a priori or maximization of ‘self-interest’
conditions.  Sen attempts to show how
conditions such as internal consistence of choice and self-interestedness can
be incoherent and result in narrow and arbitrary preferences. 

The importance of the reciprocal nature
of rationality and freedom is to be found in the idea that the demands of
rationality requires a concept of freedom. 
When it comes to an individual’s assessment of opportunities, the idea
of freedom requires reference to what a person prefers and has reason to
prefer.  In this sense, freedom depends
upon rational assessment of having different opportunities.  However, it is also the case that
rationality depends on freedom.  The
concept of freedom (specially the freedom to choose) requires the idea of
rational choice and the ability to accommodate a diversity of reasons or
opportunities that can motivate choice. 
The reasoned scrutiny of choices can only occur when agents have the
freedom to choose from a diversity of options, and not via
pre-selected models of rationality with which to conform to.

This book will be of interest
for those working in philosophy, social theory, economics, and those interested
in rationality and freedom generally. 
It provides an impressive collection of thoughts on theoretical and practical
considerations on the interrelation between rationality, social choice, and
freedom.  In Sen’s clear and penetrating
style, he provides intriguing objections to reductionist conceptions of
rationality and advances compelling alternative accounts that challenge our
understanding of the scope of individual and collective choices.

©
2003 Adrian M. Viens

Adrian M. Viens, Department of
Philosophy, Oxford University

Categories: Philosophical