This volume compiles thirteen papers presented in a conference on
scientific evidence held at Johns Hopkins in 2003. Seven are authored by former
graduate students of the editor (many of whom are now renowned philosophers)
and eight take issue with one or another aspect of his theory of evidence, so
the compilation will certainly be of interest for those who are attracted by
Peter Achinstein’s approach. But it may be equally attractive in various
degrees for those who are more generally curious about evidence.

The volume is divided in two parts, of which the first is devoted to
philosophical theories of evidence and the second to present six related case
studies in different scientific domains. The former are namely those of
Achinstein, Mayo, Norton and Whewell, though different quotas are assigned to
them. Whewell’s concept of consilience is examined and partly vindicated
by Laura Snyder, who supports a kind of version of scientific realism, if we
interpret it as an inferential pattern that appears in the theoretical
unification of various natural kinds. Norton presents his own material theory
of induction in a brief but very informative comparison to other standard
alternatives. Mayo exposes her severe test approach to evidence and defends it
from the criticism received from Achinstein. He summarises, in turn, the view
exposed in his The Book of Evidence (2001), refuting four contrary
theses. Finally, still in the first part of the book, another three papers
discuss various aspects of Achinstein’s theory: S. Gimbel defends and illustrates
the viability of a threshold concept of evidence within this framework; F.
Kronz and A. McLaughin call for its expansion to incorporate some guidelines
for the process of evidence-acquisition, drawing on Peirce’s proto-economics of
science; and S. Roush argues for the positive relevance condition that
Achinstein criticized in the name of his own explanatory based view of
evidence.

The quality of the discussion is good enough as to deserve attention
from those who are generally interested in the topic. However, they may enjoy
most the cases discussed in the second part of the book, since they all are
worth reading on their own. H. Longino and L. Principe argue for a contextual
view of evidence that challenges Achinstein’s concept of veridical
evidence. Principe shows how the concept of alchemical transmutation came to be
rejected sometime around 1700 without the addition of new evidence against it,
but as a result of somehow unrelated factors. Longino surveys what is taken to
be evidence regarding our behavior according to different theoretical
approaches that coexist today at many university departments, claiming that
pure evidential considerations will not contribute much to bring them together.
A. Rosenberg, to the contrary, ponders quite optimistically the particular
contribution that genomic evidence might make to account for human cooperation
(though without explicit implications for or against Achinstein’s view). In a
thorough and subtle analysis, R. Richards reconstructs the epistemic situation
(an Achinsteinian concept once more) in which Darwin and Wallace trace the
analogy between natural and artificial selection, showing what evidential
support could the latter provide to the former. Drawing on another concept by
Achinstein, K. Staley proposes a fine analysis of the potential evidence
that could have supported the discovery of the top quark in 1994, comparing it
with an error statistical account in the spirit of Mayo. Finally, G. Hatfield
discusses current epistemological views of introspective evidence that he
contrasts with those of some early pioneers in experimental psychology.

The
inevitable question for many readers will be to wonder how well Achinstein´s
theory of evidence fares in view of all of these arguments. The yardstick might
well be the often quoted challenge thrown by Achinstein’s dean: Does it really
account for the way evidence is actually used in science? There is no doubt
that the proposed distinctions are useful to discern and ponder the various
roles played by evidence in scientific argumentation, yet we may question what
its proper scope is. The empiricist in search of a foundational justification
for scientific beliefs will be certainly pleased with Achinstein’s theory: if
properly expanded, as suggested by Gimbel, Kronz and McLaughin, it will provide
a realistic model for rational decision making in science either in the pursuit
of new evidence or for the assessment of what we actually have. Yet, as usual,
the contributions of Principe, Longino and even Richards cast some doubts about
the convenience of such epistemological framework to account for the consensus
that scientists eventually achieve. These matters of principle would have
deserved a more explicit discussion. On the other hand, even if the second part
is titled "Applications", we will certainly miss concrete analyses of
how the combination probabilities cum explanatory nexus rationalize current or
past scientific consensus. At least for this reader, the discussion suggests
that Mayo’s approach is more effective in dealing with tests effectively
performed today in many disciplines and less committed to a foundationalist
stance. Other readers, however, will surely draw different conclusions: the
book is rich enough in arguments as to allow this to happen.

© 2005 David Teira

David Teira, Ph.D., University of Salamanca, Spain

Categories: Philosophical