In defending a voluntaristic conception of naturalized metaphysics, Anjan Chakravartty brings ancient skepticism to bear on contemporary scientific ontology. He considers scientific ontology to be inherently meta-scientific, since scientific practice underdetermines scientific ontology, but maintains that scientific ontology is not separate from science itself. This means that the work is more philosophical and less focused on case studies than much of recent philosophy of science. Scientific ontology focuses on metaphysical inferences and presuppositions that are sufficiently informed by or sensitive to scientific-empirical investigation. This ultimately makes his view more focused on epistemology than metaphysics, which he calls a “transformative epistemology of scientific ontology,” and moves us away from some standard dichotomies peculiar to much of philosophy of science, like realism versus anti-realism, and reductionism versus anti-reductionism. Overall, Chakravartty’s approach is consistent with recent moves toward pluralism in contemporary philosophy of science and philosophy of biology.

For example, he argues for a form of pluralism about epistemic stances toward scientific ontology. The three main stances he considers are: (1) the deflationary stance; (2) the empiricist stance; (3) the metaphysical stance. These stances are usually considered as different sides in the realism versus antirealism debate. The first stance rejects realist understandings of scientific ontology and the analyses of truth and reference with which they are typically explicated. He further sub-divides the deflationary stance into three types: historicist, sociological or pragmatic. The second, championed by Bas van Fraassen, rejects demands for explanation in terms of things underlying the observable and attempts to answer these demands by theorizing about the unobservable. The third, or realist stance, accepts demands for explanation in terms of things underlying the observable and attempts to answer these demands by theorizing about the unobservable. Chakravartty argues that the three stances, which are epistemically foundational, cannot be assigned truth values, but are better seen as ways of approaching scientific ontology. According to him, stances are adopted because they reflect an individual’s values. But as to assessing the outright superiority of a rational stance, Chakravartty recommends aphasia, or speechlessness, and suspension of judgment. This realization, in turn, elicits a state of ataraxia, or tranquility, akin to the goal of skepticism à la Sextus Empiricus. Anyone familiar with, but not heavily invested in, the realism versus antirealism debate may sympathize with the view that it is to a certain degree intractable.

However, the argument he offers for this intractability based on the persistence of epistemic stances is unpersuasive. This argument is, at the very least, an oversimplification of the progress and purpose of the realism versus anti-realism debate. Haven’t earlier versions of such stances, for example certain forms of sociologically based deflationary accounts, proved to be untenable? One might further take issue with lumping many different stances together under these three groups. Historicist, sociological, and pragmatic stances share some commonalities, but different intuitions seem to be grounding these views. What exactly is persisting between different versions of the deflationary stance, other than a distaste for metaphysics? Not liking something is not a view. Despite these minor taxonomic issues, Chakravartty’s skeptical pluralism provides a platform for understanding how to make headway in the debate about scientific ontology.

Like many contemporary philosophers of science, Chakravartty defends a pluralism which does not entail that anything goes. But what goes and what does not is what is a bit difficult to puzzle out. Epistemologically speaking, this is a defense of a more permissive form of rationality, which entails that conflicting judgments about scientific ontology can be rationally permissible. There is more than one way to skin a cat. However the permissibility he advocates is constrained by the internal coherence of a particular stance, and whether it violates the basic axioms of probability. This latter condition is underdeveloped in the book.

He also distinguished his view from one of the main recent forms of scientific pluralism, that offered by Kellert, Longino and Waters in their edited volume from 2006, Scientific Pluralism. On their view, one ought to adopt a pluralist stance, because science provides reason to think that the world is messy, at least in certain places. However, on Chakravartty’s view the world is not messy, but the epistemic lives of actual people are messy. This latter sort of messiness demands a more general skeptical response.  Nevertheless, one should note that Kellert et al. also call for a certain degree of agnosticism, and perhaps skepticism, about the way the world is. This is why they refer to their own view as the pluralist stance. Note that they even adopt the relatively neutral or noncommittal term “stance,” over something like “theory” or “view,” in much the same fashion as Chakravartty. On their account, science reveals which areas of the world call for pluralism, and which call for monism. A fuller treatment is warranted to separate the differences between these two “approaches” to scientific ontology.

In sum, this book is a must read for those invested in scientific ontology, scientific pluralism, and voluntarist epistemology, and for those who seek new, yet old ways of approaching realism and reductionism in philosophy of science. On the other hand, for those who have gone on to spend most of their time puzzling over case studies in particular science, and how much of general philosophy of science might apply on a case to case basis, this book will leave them with more questions than answers. But make sure to pay attention to why Chakravartty wishes to move away from case studies. Overall, Scientific Ontology is a worthy follow up to his 2007 offering, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism.

© 2018 Justin Bzovy 

Justin Bzovy, Ph.D., Philosophy Department, University of Alberta