In Seeing,
Doing, and Knowing, Mohan Matthen has certainly produced a well constructed
theory of perception. Both the (much appreciated) detailed analytic table of
contents and the list of definitions and named theses presented at the end of
the book are testament to the depth of analysis that is offered. While the
journey through the book may be long and winding, ultimately it is worth
making.

Matthen states that the aim of this
book is to examine the nature of what he calls sense-features, such as colors
and shapes, and how they are represented. The particular sense modality that
is the main focus of this work is vision, and the particular sense-feature that
he concentrates on is color.

He begins by introducing the "Sensory
Classification Thesis". He argues that sensory systems are "automatic
sorting machines" capable of sorting objects into categories "according
to how they should be treated for the purposes of physical manipulation and
investigation" (page 8). What makes this claim particularly interesting
is that it is the activity of classifying that is at the heart of these
categories. A sense-feature is a property of an object in virtue of the
activity of classification. So orange is the property of certain objects, not
because the sensory system perceives these objects as orange and thus categorizes
them as such, but rather because the sensory system has assigned them
into the ‘orange’ category. Thus sensory classification does not result as a
response to the perception of sense-features. Rather, sensory experience
actually follows sensory classification. In chapter two, he sets out to defend
the Sensory Classification Thesis by discussing ideas prevalent in modern
psychology and cognitive science.

Matthen
goes on to argue that perception and action are intricately connected in two
ways. Firstly, perception enables the organism to interact successfully with
its surrounding environment and secondly, it facilitates the organism’s
gathering of information about worldly objects, thus enabling it to predict the
ways in which these distal objects will consequently behave. It is through the
classification of sense-features that this is possible. However, classification
is species relative and is dependent upon the animal’s biological systems and
the environmental niche in which it resides. An animal will classify
sense-features according to the needs it has for the successful interaction
with its environment. Matthen calls this view "Pluralistic Realism."
This does not mean, however, that classification is a subjective matter, for he
argues that classification can be either right or wrong. Sense-features are
correctly classified if so doing facilitates the optimal functioning of the
animal with respect to the particular activity that the classification is
supposed to assist. Thus, to take Matthen’s example, dogs can wrongly classify
colors if they classify them in the way that humans do, because to do so would
disrupt the way that color classification is supposed to aid the dog’s
functioning.

 Although the book is
extremely well argued and structured, it is also highly technical and as such
is not really accessible to the general audience. Without a substantial
knowledge of many of the terms and ideas relevant to the philosophy of
perception it would probably be very difficult to follow the overall argument.

For all
its technicality, however, Matthen’s language is fairly easy to follow. The
difficulty comes in attempting to keep track of the many theses outlined in the
book — the directory at the back is essential here. For those with a
reasonable level of understanding of the philosophy and psychology of
perception, this book is well worth the read and is an essential addition to
the canon of literature on the subject.

© 2005 Stephen Chadwick

Stephen Chadwick, PhD teaches on
the Philosophy programme at Massey University, New Zealand.

Categories: Philosophical