In spite of its important role in everyday moral reflection and deliberation, self-fulfillment has, by and large, been a neglected topic in recent ethical theory. Self-fulfillment is here understood as living one’s life well; because doing so may conflict with various moral requirements, the pursuit of this ideal entails a variety of dangers: egoism, elitism, self-absorption or self-denial and even evil-doing. Moreover, to those who are critical of representations of the self as unified, the concept of self-fulfillment will appear inevitably confused.

Gewirth’s project in this book is to vindicate the place of self-fulfillment as a coherent and worthy ideal compatible with a universalistic ethics. He does this through a dialectical method, presenting familiar theses and the most important objections, then seeking to advance the discussion by proposing modified theses which can overcome the objections.

Gewirth discusses, in depth, the two main — and diverging — understandings of self-fulfillment. The first, aspiration-fulfillment, is subjective and consists in the fulfillment of one’s deepest desires or goals; the second, capacity-fulfillment is objective, and consists in making the best of oneself. While the two are clearly distinct conceptions of self-fulfillment, they need not be mutually incompatible, because people (should) have second-order aspirations to develop their best capacities.

Aspiration-fulfillment turns out to be an important component of self-fulfillment, compatible with elements of what Gewirth calls a personalistic morality (based on individuals’ needs and capacities) and a particularistic morality (centered on special duties towards those with whom we have special relationships.) But this can never be the full story.  Aspirations may be misguided or evil, and therefore an overall validation of self-fulfillment must rely on objective values. These are provided by universalistic morality, Gewirth’ own version of Kantianism, grounded in individuals’ equality and the primacy of human rights. The cornerstone of the argument is Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency. We cannot be rational agents who act freely and pursue our own good unless our rights are being respected and unless we are able to respect others’ equal rights. Rational agency is something we value, at least implicitly. Therefore, violating the conditions necessary for rational agency must be inconsistent.

The version of capacities-fulfillment eventually defended by Gewirth — one based on the pursuit of those values that contribute to freedom and well-being — is highly moralized. While moralization does make self-fulfillment compatible with morality, it also makes Gewirth‘s conception of self-fulfillment look rather too remote from more common-sense conceptions. For this reason, it is, in the end, unclear that the later can be accommodated within the constraints imposed by morality.

Some readers will find many of the arguments in this book familiar from discussions about happiness, especially in the context of virtue ethics. Various sub-chapters address the relationship between self-fulfillment and ethical questions that became marginal in contemporary ethics, such as the meaning of life and duties to oneself. The book is also important for readers interested in Gewirth’s general contribution to ethical theory.

© 2011 Anca Gheaus

Anca Gheaus is a post-doctoral researcher at the Philosophy Faculty of the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. She works on theories of care and justice on which she has published several book chapters and articles in Raisons Politiques, Feminist Theory, Basic Income Studies and Hypatia.