Structure and Agency
chronicles the rise of symbolic interactionism (SI), a perspective on human
nature that rose to prominence in the social sciences in the middle of the
twentieth century. The "symbolic" part of its label refers to its
foremost concern, the mind. "Interactionism" refers to its basic
principle that the self and society are dialectically related. They each affect
each other. The significance of SI social theory is that it provided a language
for talking about the influence of socio-cultural expectations on individual
development. Without, that is, negating the real participation of the self. In
other words, SI proposes that structure and agency, stability and change, are
both features of everyday living.

What is interesting about SI’s
picture of being human lies in the details. Musolf provides plenty of detail,
exploring the contributions of William James, John Dewey and George Herbert
Mead, among others. He comments on the insights offered by numerous lesser
known contemporary sociologists in relation to controversial topics such as the
public regulation of deviance, moral relativism, gender identity and media
socialization. Perhaps the most striking part of the book is Musolf’s
introduction to the work Irving Goffman. Goffman’s work on performances is
refreshingly innovative, even when it re-appears in textbook format.

Readers of Metapsychology might
be particularly interested in the chapter "Mind," where Musolf
elaborates the pivotal SI concept. Essentially, it is a discussion of the
construction of identity. According to SI theory, one’s identity is formed
through interaction with significant, or "referent," others. We develop
vocabularies from this interaction with which we come to see the world. We also
tailor our actions in anticipation of what others would say about them. So, for
instance, a 1970 study of nudists revealed that they did not talk about their
nudism when they thought it would affect the relationship they had with a
particular interlocutor. Still, nudism was a style of living that made sense to
those same people in the context of nudist friends, and nudist culture more
generally.

Various SI theorists have stressed
that the awareness we have about each others’ identities influences and guides
our behavior. Besides forming "references" for appropriate actions,
individuals interact through "role-taking." The idea is that we make
judgments about other people based on the social roles they occupy. In
role-taking we imagines how others view the world, and how they view us as a
part of it. Role-taking short-circuits truly getting to know someone, however,
because it encourages us to generalize on the basis of a very few, usually
superficial, facts. The most important mechanism for identity-formation, says Musolf,
is something dubbed "self-indication." Self-indication means that
individuals represent the meaning of situations to themselves, and then act
accordingly. Of course, some of the things people can become aware of are the
social constraints that exist on their interactions and on the formation of
their desires and preferences. "Self-indication allows us to make history,
not be made by history. It allows freedom, spontaneity, and novelty."
(194-195) SI theorists first used the concept of "self-indication" to
oppose naturalistic and seemingly deterministic accounts of human nature that
were popular, like social Darwinism and behaviorism.

This book is intended to be used as
a textbook by undergraduate and graduate students studying social psychology.
The style and tone is geared to a scholarly audience, though the concepts are
presented at an introductory level. Musolf aims to be comprehensive rather than
original. Those looking for a general introduction to sociology, and
particularly to the SI tradition, will be pleased that this text generously
surveys the major contributors and competently renders the main concepts at
play. Unfortunately, it labors under the sheer weight of introducing and
translating the technical jargon of all the academic theory it distills.

What is missing from this work is a
critical perspective on SI. Musolf charts the successes of SI with the manners
of a neutral observer. Students of social theory would be better taught if they
were also exposed to some of the shortcomings of SI’s explanatory power. The
theory of mind that SI offers, to take an example, ought to be judged in the
context of other, more recent, vocabularies for discerning how the mind works,
such as those in philosophy of mind, neurobiology, socio-linguistics, or
contemporary psychoanalytic theory. It is too much to ask Musolf to explain
these alternatives. Still, to give almost no mention of SI’s blindspots tends
to exaggerate its importance, and makes it seem as if this theory codes for
nothing other than common sense.

Among the strengths of Structure
and Agency, though, is the way it situates its main object of study
historically and contextually. The first half of the book introduces social
psychology by way of pursuing SI’s ancestors and founding figures. In the
second half the author textures his explanation of the theory by relating SI to
contemporary questions and issues. The result is that readers come away with an
understanding of what has motivated various developments in social psychology. Musolf
is intent on rendering the discipline accessible; he is sensitive to the
demands of his audience. This book is not likely to inspire interest in social
theory. But if you are already interested in getting a grounding in this
important stream of social psychology, it is a good place to start.

© 2004 Karen Kachra

Karen Kachra is a PhD candidate
in the department of philosophy at Northwestern University in Evanston,
Illinois. She is currently writing a dissertation about political agency,
titled The Problem of Agency: Foucault, Feminism and Socially Constructed
Subjects. Please direct any correspondence to k-kachra@northwestern.edu.

Categories: Psychology