Mark Solms seems a driven man. In his eyes (and in
this case, also those of fellow researcher Oliver Turnbull), Psychoanalysis is
dying. In his new text, The Brain
and the Inner World, Solms has examined the patient and his diagnosis calls
for a swift transfusion of “hard science,” a dose of empirical evidence from
what some might consider an unlikely source and, most importantly of all, a
change in philosophy that, the authors argue, is more in line with Freud’s
original intentions. All this, Solms and Turnbull suggest, can be accomplished
by simply embracing neuroscience. As an
aside, he thinks big brother Neuroscience could learn a few things from his
ailing sibling.

Their thesis is presented in a
systematic fashion, carefully describing theoretical areas most familiar to
practitioners and showing how recent advances in the neuroscience have mapped
them physiologically. Simple concepts like how the neuron works are preceded by
a careful instruction on how case studies of individuals with localized
neurological damage reveal the inner workings of the brain. The first chapter
begins with most basic of basics, the aforementioned neuron, types of
neurotransmitters, sensory modalities, etc.

The second chapter moves on to the underlying
basics, the assumptions and philosophy of the authors. Beginning with a short history of the
“mind-brain problem,” or how what we experience as selfhood arises from neurological
sources, Solms and Turnbull divide the possible solutions to this problem into
“easy” and “hard” researches. Easy answers refer to those that just locate
which neurological processes correlate with a specific function. The hard
answer involves telling how it functions. One shows you what parts of the brain
make the mind; the other explains how we come to experience consciousness.
After giving a brief history of past attempts to answer either easy (much
current research is reductive in this sense, they assert) or hard (Descartes’
famous dualism), the authors move to the theoretical lynchpin of the text.
Coining their approach “dual-aspect monism,” Solms and Turnbull assert that the
mind body problem isn’t a problem at all, just two different points of view.
There is one “thing” (the monist part of their philosophy) and two prevailing
ways to see it, as mind or brain (the dualist portion). Both metapsychological
and physical models of the mind are simply conceptual tools limited by their
distinct points of view. Combining the phenomenological, introspective approach
of psychoanalytic theory with the physical grounding of neuroscience solves the
weakness of each. They go further by
clarifying that the mind itself or the underlying systems that compose it are
unconscious. It’s only when the mind itself looks inward that we sense the “me”
of the individual.

The following chapters tackle the nature of
consciousness with a systematic exploration of current neuroscientific data and
a simultaneous return to Freud. Solms
and Turnbull suggest that, like Freud, most mental processes aren’t conscious.
Furthermore, they outline consciousness as an evolutionary advantage, the
reflexive ability to apprehend our inner state and use it to act in the
external world. We become conscious of hunger, reflect on the feeling and then
act to seek satiation. Without much strain, the authors suggest, one can see
the Freudian Ego in that conception. With just a bit more concentration, the
authors suggest that Freud’s Id can be found in contemporary understanding of
emotion centers. The core sense of self is essentially emotional, Solms and
Turnbull assert. It is the internal signal that is reflected on, that leads to
motivated action. They further pull from neuroscientific data to illustrate
four basic “command systems” of emotions, suggesting that these are modifiable
through experience (what feels one way to you is different for me) and it is
the work of the “ego” of consciousness (theoretically linked to the frontal
cortex) to respond to these emotions through action or inhibition. Memory is
tackled next, with the authors giving a brief summary of how memory is
organized across neurological systems and connecting certain aspects of memory
to transference and countertransference.

Solms’ specialty, dreams, is given a remarkably
detailed account. The authors sketch a concise history of research and current
thinking on dreams. Solms and Turnbull take the dominant dream theory to task
and, with an impressive list of past and recent data, reinstate some of Freud’s
concepts. Using the example of sexual development (something that has
significant impact on one’s “inner world”), the authors show how environment
and genetic potential are interwoven, making a case against current trends to
oversimplify such connections. Finally,
a break-neck drive through the “left brain/right brain controversy” leads the
authors to illustrate, with fascinating examples of two individuals with
differing disorders of language, how psychoanalytic theory illuminates and
assists in negotiating neurological deficit.

The final two chapters offer a summary, a further
reconciliation between psychoanalytic theory and neuroscience, a call to change
or die for the psychoanalytic community and a description of the new discipline
of Neuro-psychoanalysis. Solms and
Turnbull further explore the possible neurobiological support for
psychotherapy, connecting the “talking cure” with expanding the inhibitory
power of the frontal cortex and giving physiological credence to Freud’s notion
that psychopathological cure involves expansion of the ego. The final pages are
devoted to the fledgling disciple the authors have pioneered, with an
impressive listing of luminaries in the field of neuroscience and
psychoanalysis contributing/supporting. Solms and Turnbull conclude with a call
for further testing of psychoanalytic theory, the advances in neuroscience that
make this testing possible and, as a result, psychoanalytic theory restored to
its place in the halls of science.

There is much to admire in this text. The authors
display an uncanny ability to translate the obliquity of brain science into a
user-friendly package. Solms’ and Turnbull’s skill in gathering and distilling
the vast information of current neuroscience, presenting it so as to be
understood by the simplest neophyte and connecting it to psychoanalytic theory
is a near miracle. In fact, the authors’ ability to simplify extends to
psychoanalytic theory itself. Freud can be no less complicated than
neuroscience and both are made bite sized by Solms and Turnbull. Furthermore,
their opening thesis, that advances in the field of neuroscience beg to be
melded with psychoanalytic tried and true, is so eloquently presented and
supported, even the most jaded critic must take notice.

Frankly, the only criticism applicable,
in this writer’s view, is their diagnosis of psychoanalytic theory’s ill health
and prescription for neuroscientific relief. Certainly, many in the field of
both disciplines would disagree. Some might argue that empirical evidence of
any kind does away with the subjective nature of psychoanalysis, its life
blood. A process rooted in the here and now, flowing between two
subjectivities, can only be harmed by the imposition of experience-distant
“facts.” Furthermore, the lone practitioner may not find his everyday
therapeutic endeavors altered by anything in this book. Many may be left
feeling “It ain’t broke, so why fix it,” since nothing in this text suggest
problems in technique. If psychoanalysis is dying, why doesn’t it seem to be
doing anything wrong?

That said, Solms and Turnbull are
good for psychoanalysis. At best they spark debate, offer jaw dropping insights
and poke accepted theory in the eye. In this sense, they follow the best in
Freud. Challenging mainstream thought and blowing a few minds in the process,
this is what psychoanalysis and all of science needs from its heirs to Freud.

© 2002 Dan L. Rose

Dan L. Rose, Psy.D. is a Clinical
Psychologist involved in direct clinical work and training at Columbus State
University and in private practice. His interests include psychoanalysis,
neuroscience, religion and literature.

Categories: Psychoanalysis