The Cambridge Companion to Adorno consists of sixteen essays covering
the thinking of Theodor Adorno in a single book.  Like others in this series, this volume is designed for both
first time readers and for specialists alike. 
It serves as a way to introduce some of Adorno’s concerns.  At the same time, it provides an access or
entry point into the secondary literature. There are seven essays that
cover some aspect of music, aesthetics and/or art, including one on his
relation to Thomas Mann.  Two essays
cover moral philosophy.  Two contributors
cover Adorno’s contribution to critical theory.  Two essays cover Adorno and Heidegger, which establish the
connections between the two rather than dwelling on Adorno’s stated criticism
of Heidegger.  There is an essay on
Adorno’s take on Marx and materialism, one on Kant and Freud, and finally one
on doing Hegelian philosophy after Hegel.

Over the years, some editions of the Cambridge Companion have
received a mixed reception.  Some of
this relates to a criticism over which authors are chosen and which are not
chosen and also which themes are talked about and which themes remain in
reticence.  On the whole, the Cambridge
Companion to Adorno should not receive this reception.  It is a successful volume and a fine
addition to the growing secondary literature and commentary on Adorno.  There are several essays that standout for
quality of writing and level of scholarship. 
These include J.M. Bernstein’s "Negative Dialectic as Fate",
Simon Jarvis’ "Adorno, Marx, Materialism"; and finally Lydia Goehr’s
"Dissonant Works and the Listening Public".  The other strenght of this volume, outside of these individual
essays, is that it provides accessibility to readers who might have been
intimidated by some of Adorno’s nonphilosophical interests.  For instance, readers who have no background
in musicology or who have not read Adorno’s writings on music will be given an
excellent entry point.

The format and structure of this companion series makes for creating a
successful volume very difficult and challenging.  The first challenge is that the Cambridge Companions limits
itself to a single book format, which places comprehensiveness of its coverage
into severe pressure.  But this volume,
as others in the series, does not aim for an exhaustive coverage of all major
themes.  It is not, for instance, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, edited by John V. Canfield, which has 15 volumes.  Instead,
it is a companion, which is meant to give access to a thinker’s most important
questions and a critical overview of his/her most essential ideas.  But as a consequence of aiming
to be a companion, the second challenge of this series is providing enough
coverage for the essential ideas of the thinker/philosopher.

The tension caused by these two challenges are present in the Cambridge
Companion to Adorno.  Adorno’s thinking covered a wide
territory–a landscape that moves from technical philosophy to matters related
to culture and music.  He was a
prodigious writer.  In the collected
writings, there are in total twenty volumes. 
A newly edited and organized series of Adorno’s posthumous writings
(consisting of lectures, correspondences, and notebooks) will have thirty
volumes.  His writings move into
discussions of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Bergson, and Heidegger, to name a
few.  Thematically, he covered issues of
the enlightenment, freedom, reason, moral theory and aesthetics.  Outside of technical philosophy, Adorno
wrote in leading journals and newspapers concerning cultural and social
matters.  But that which stands out the
most is his interest in music, both as a musicologist and as a
theoretician/philosopher of music.  An
indication of the importance of music to Adorno is that one-third of the
collected writings of Adorno are concerned with music.  So the inherent challenge with a book aiming
at providing a critical overview of Adorno thinking rests precisely in
providing enough space inside a single volume to cover his essential ideas and
major insights.  On the whole, the editor Tom Huhn successfully navigates
through these challenges.  Certaintly
there are some problems.  For instance, no
essay covers Adorno and Kierkegaard.  He
completed his Habilitationsschrift on Kierkegaard’s aesthetics.  There are only a handful of references to
Walter Benjamin, who was influential on Adorno.  The relationship between
phenomenology and Adorno is also lightly discussed, via the comparison of
Heidegger and Adorno.  The fact that
Adorno completed a dissertation on Husserl would seem to provide a lot of
material for a critical essay.  Despite
these gaps in coverage, this is still an excellent volume for the quality of
the contributor’s essays and for the broad coverage of themes.

With Adorno’s broad interests in
philosophy and cultural matters, the relevant question is, where does Adorno’s
thinking begin?  Or rather, what themes
should be raised first in a companion volume to Adorno?  In placing J.M. Bernstein’s "Negative
Dialectics as Fate" as the first essay in the volume, it seems that
Adorno’s thinking begins with Hegel. 
Adorno is Hegelian.  But this is
a very subtle and complicated statement. 
Bernstein notes that Hegel is "…more routinely and emphatically
present as its orientation, its method, approach, style, or conantus"
(19).  He accepts the kernel of Hegelian
idealism.  This means that Adorno denies
the notion that there is a fundamental first ground, whether this is
mind/nature, subject/object, etc. 
Instead, mediation requires something that is to be mediated, as there
is no pure immediacy without its mediations, which are always historical and
social (Bernstein 19).

At the same time, to suggest that
Adorno’s thinking is Hegelian uncovers a paradox.  Bernstein observes that this stems from Hegel’s conception of
philosophy and history.  For Hegel,
philosophy comes from one’s own historical time and history produces one’s own
philosophical language.  The social and
historical conditions set the boundaries for the possibilities of philosophical
expression and thus thought.  So by
doing Hegelian philosophy, the methods and the techniques are Hegelian but the
conclusions are not from Hegel.  Rather
themes and the conclusions becomes a product of being-in-the-world.  This means that the possibilities of
expression in philosophical thinking after the French Revolution are different
from the possibilities of expression in thinking after Auschwitz.  For Hegel, the seminal event was the French
Revolution because it is "…formative for our education toward freedom
and its embodiment in the modern liberal state" (20).  For Adorno, "…Auschwitz revealed the
intransigent moment of violence in the modern conception of reason, the idea
and ideals of reason as given by Kant and, however differently, by Hegel"
(20).  So to do Hegelian philosophy
after Hegel’s time is do philosophy in a different language.

The other twist to Hegel’s idea
about philosophy and history, which adds more nuance to the notion that Adorno
is a Hegelian, is that philosophy is at its end and is no longer
necessary.  This can be taken in two
different ways.  First, it is the
Hegelian notion of the end of philosophy as absolute knowing.  Second, it is the left Hegelian view of the
"ideal transparent society" (Bernstein 20).  But with both not coming to fruition, this means that Adorno is
doing Hegelian philosophy after philosophy did not end.  Philosophy is alive because it still needs
to engage reason.  This means that
Hegelian ideas take on a transfiguration and enter into a new dynamic in
Adorno’s historical setting. Thus Adorno is a Hegelian doing Hegelian
philosophy in a different historical world.

Adorno’s social and critical
writings focus on his historical world. 
But the conditions of the world now are even different than in Adorno’s
time.  So an implication of Bernstein’s
take on Adorno being a Hegelian after Hegel is that the project of philosophy,
in a Hegelian lens, will continue to exists, beyond Adorno, because of changing
historical and social conditions.  There
is a need for philosophy to continue to investigate modernity in its contemporary
manifestation along with the related concepts of freedom and reason.  But this project can only continue by
starting with Adorno’s work on these subjects. 
This is why the interest and the effort to continue to translate and
publish Adorno’s writings is a welcomed sight. 
And so the Cambridge Companion to Adorno will serve scholars and
students alike.

© 2006 Robert Ramos

Robert Ramos, M.A.
Candidate in Philosophy at the New School for Social Research

Categories: Philosophical