The author in this book argues that
the conscious machines can be built, but rejects artificial intelligence and
classical neural networks in favor of the emulation of the cognitive processes
of the brain, proposing a special cognitive architecture to reproduce the
perceptual processes, inner imagery, inner speech, pleasure, pain, emotion, and
the cognitive functions behind these. He proposes a realization of novel
artificial neurons and non–numeric signal-level representations that carry
dedicated meanings. The machine is expected to produce higher-level functions
by the power of the elementary processing unit, the artificial neuron, without
algorithms or programs. The dedicated chips would have to be designed,
consequently for such a machine.

"The real challenge of
consciousness is its apparent immaterial nature."  The author raises questions like, "Does
a conscious machine really perceive the flow of inner speech and imagery as
immaterial?", "Does it perceive the possession of an immaterial
self?", and "Is it aware of its own existence?"(5) The book
presents author’s answer- proposals to these and other similarly related questions.       

The book, to begin with, presents a
brief history and a review of computing principles, arguments against the
concept of thinking as the execution of strings of program commands, artificial
neural networks as a better way to realize such a machine.

The book is in three Parts. Part 1
is on thinking and computation and on artificial neural networks considered as
to the latter’s rescue. Part II is on cognition and consciousness and covers
all the processes referred to in the first paragraph above, and Part III
presents design philosophy and model for machine cognition and consciousness,
discussing the general nature of consciousness in the light of this model.

Part III is critical to the
proposed theme of the book. The author intends developing and proposing machine
models that could emulate or duplicate the processes of human cognition and
even consciousness. To what extent can this be done? "Could there be any
convincing arguments that a cognitive machine would possess any of the sought
after properties? What if anything would the design of cognitive machines tell
about the problem of consciousness? What should this machine be like and how
would it differ from existing computers?" (169).

What has followed in Part III, now,
as a sequel to author’s commitment to the questions above are a series of nine
chapters which present discussion on: Machine Models for Cognition and
Consciousness-Introduction, Representation of Information, Artificial
Associative Neurons and Neuron Groups, Models for Machine Perception Processes,
A Cognition Machine Architecture, Models for Motor Functions, Machine Emotions,
Language and Inner Speech, Inner Imagery and Thinking, Machine Consciousness,
and Technology and Final Questions. Arising out of these discussions and considering
several other aspects of the modeling process, such as "A complicated
environment, conflicting lists of tasks, goals and needs as well as evoked
memories and possibilities for inference would be a real challenge to any
cognitive system…. .(168)", the author outlines the general requirements
for a cognitive machine. The requirements proposed are:(1) "A suitable
method for the representation of information must be devised. (2) Suitable
information processing elements that allow the manipulation of information by
the chosen representation method must be designed. (3) A machine architecture
that can accommodate censors, effectors, the processes of perception,
introspection and the grounding of meaning as well as the flow of inner speech
and inner imagery must be designed. (4) The system design must also accommodate
the functions of thinking and reasoning, emotions and language (168)."

According to the author, his
approach is not entirely theoretical. He has developed experimental chips that
are suitable for the implementation of proposed cognitive architecture. There
are others also who have achieved similar goals. "New technology will
arise," to change the future. However, according to him, as also according
to others, "Will machine consciousness, implemented on a chip, resolve the
philosophical questions about mind and consciousness for once and all"
(263)? He admits, however though, that "many questions will be clarified
and become trivial as we become familiar with the consciousness of the machine"
(263), none the less, many questions still remain open.

One continues to ponder about
Skillful Robots, Mind on Silicon, and Consciousness and Self or Raise the Dead
as realizable enigma. He talks about Star Trek Movie and Cloning, and their
realizability and the conceptual and logical questions that come up in this
context.

In this concluding section, the
author lets loose his imagination, discussing immediately  realizable and remote-future possibilities.
Virtual minds," the author ponders, are the copies, more or less accurate
of the originals yet the thin consciousness of these would not be that of the
original. "Would there be a way to capture the real consciousness and
identity of a dead person and could we transfer the consciousness of a living person
into a machine?"

To what extent cloning can be used
to this advantage employing the "technique of implanting artificial
memories, known to psychology nowadays. Given enough time, all essential
personal history might be implanted by employing means that are available now.
The authors continues to stretch his imagination to examine the possibility of
`raising the dead.’ However, "a perfect biological copy, even with a
perfectly copied mind, is not the original" (268).

The author, while concluding,
raises other issues such as "Getting into the Machine,"  "Final Question: Being
Inside,"  "Our
Existence", "Identity, and scope of our Consciousness." He
concludes by stating whether a "conscious machine also, due to the
apparent immaterial nature of its thoughts, reproduce Descartes’ error and
infer the existence of immaterial mind? 
Will the machine, too, come to the conclusion that there is something
special in being here, to exist as a self-conscious individual"?

During the course of discussions
the author raises several other issues as for instance that of the Easy and
Hard Problem of Consciousness, described by the following terms: qualia or feel
of the percepts, phenomenal consciousness, conscious experience, what does it
mean when a conscious subject is phenomenally feeling something. "Will not
the conscious machine operate without any felt sensations in a kind of zombie
like manner? Would this kind of system, if complex enough, appear to have
consciousness? May be, and it might even insist that it has subjective
experiences" (146).

It is a fascinating presentation of
various issues relating to the emulation of consciousness by a machine and its
capabilities. The problems that confound the issues have been so clearly and
precisely presented that even a beginner student will have no difficulty in
getting at the meanings. For the undergraduates it will be a comprehensibly
readable text.   Meaningfully precise
presentation has gone a long way to support the quality of text.

 

©
2003 G.C. Gupta

 

Dr. G.C. Gupta, Visiting Professor
of Cognitive Science, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, India

Categories: Psychology