The problem that Tomasello sets out to solve is how is it possible that a wide range of human cognitive skills evolved in such a short time. He states that normal processes of biological evolution cannot be appealed to in this explanation because these processes are too slow to account for the presence of these skills within the accepted evolutionary time frame.

One part of his explanation centers chiefly on showing how learning, linguistic and otherwise, is dependent on understanding other humans as being intentional agents. If this understanding of others as intentional agents were not in place, he states that other achievements such as passing down accumulated knowledge from one generation to the next would not be possible. The conclusion to this part of his argument is that because humans have this unique ability to see others as intentional beings this can ultimately account for linguistic, cultural and historical achievement that in turn explains the speed of human cognitive development.

The argument, however, when considered from a philosophical point of view, has a significant problem because it is a "boot-strap" argument. In other words, it assumes the very thing it is trying to prove. Even if it is highly plausible to claim that an understanding of others as intentional agents explains a multitude of cognitive advancements, how is this very understanding of others as intentional agents itself to be explained other than as a particular cognitive skill that happened to evolve somehow?

If the goal is to have an explanation in evolutionary terms of all facets of human cognitive power, this ability to understand others as intentional agents must also be accounted for. This is especially the case, since this ability in Tomasello’s argument plays a foundational role.

One assumes that this special ability of understanding others as intentional agents also cannot be accounted for with the normal process of biological evolution. If these special abilities, such as understanding others as intentional agents, cannot be explained in terms of normal processes of biological evolution, are they to be explained in terms of a special type of biological evolution? Or is it be explained by some sort of paranormal or divine intervention? (A sort of explanation that makes most contemporary philosophers, at least, shudder.) In any case, this kind of explanation would be as odd as claiming that normal processes of biological evolution occurred, but they were sped up fantastically in order to arrive, within the specified time, at the range and power of human cognitive skills that we can now observe. If human cognitive skills are to be explained in terms of a process of biological evolution, a goal that many currently espouse, then those cognitive skills cannot be the basis of an explanation for themselves. In Tomasello’s explanation, the evolution of the various human cognitive skills can only be accounted for by the presence of other equally complex cognitive skills.

It may be that the explanation for these abilities is not practically possible, in which case, this is just so much quibbling. From an anthropological and cultural point of view, however, Tomasello does flesh out a highly plausible story. In any case, the book provides a provocative and intriguing account of how our cognitive skills may have evolved as they have within a particular time frame. The cultural origins of human cognition is well written and accessible. It would be of particular interest to those concerned with the evolution of human consciousness, philosophers of mind and science, as well as psychologists and anthropologists.

© Helen Prosser 2001

Helen Prosser is a recent PhD graduate of Monash University in Melbourne. Her thesis dealt with issues in Philosophy of Language.

Categories: General, Philosophical