This book was published first in 2012 and appraised since that time as “the best introduction to the philosophy of the emotions on the market”. This English version comes out from a French one Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion (2008). It is intended to provide the reader with a general introduction to the philosophy of emotions by presenting a good number of theories of emotions. It is narrated by reconstructing, so to speak, a stream of theories which connect with one another logically. In this respect the book is clear insofar as, generally, every subsequent chapter presents theories which more or less emerge from (either by developing or criticizing) those presented in the preceding one. The narrative aims at what, in the end, will reveal Deonna & Teroni’s theory of emotions. This makes the whole of the book easy to follow. On the other hand, however, the book leaves beyond its range a number of theories and authors. True, they are currently not dominating the philosophical discussion about emotions, but, in my view, they should not be omitted, especially if one wants his introduction to be a general and not a selective one. I have in mind Aquinas, Spinoza and Scheler, whose names are regrettably absent. On the whole, the structure of the book is clear: it consists of ten chapters of similar length, each of them opened by an introduction and ending with a conclusion, followed by questions and further readings and endnotes. My impression, however, is that the conclusion is often nothing more than a summary of the chapter.

Chapter 1 (Homing in on the emotions, pp. 1-13) touches first upon the role of feelings in emotions, then upon the intentionality and epistemology of emotions. In my view this is the weakest chapter of the book (and I have an impression that the further it goes the better it is). This is because I do not see where the discussion starts: Deonna & Teroni refer simultaneously to systematic theories and everyday expressions. We have here a mixture of what is generally held on the one hand, and several examples (provided mostly by the language of emotions) of more systematic treatment on the other. From the very beginning we are informed that emotions are “contrast[ed] with other affective phenomena and, more generally, other psychological states” (p. 1), yet the taxonomy and its criteria are not conveyed. The chapter is more focused on the language of emotions and its features rather than on a description of emotions (it is not before Ch. 3 that we read that “the grammar” should not be taken “too seriously in the case of emotion terms”, p. 31). Even if the chapter ends with some observations on differences between emotions and other affective and psychological states, only some of them are developed, and, again, this is done without providing sharp distinctions and a taxonomy of affective and psychological states as such. When I read in the conclusion to this chapter that “[e]motions are episodes that have a felt character and are directed at particular objects provided by their cognitive bases” (p. 11), I am not sure if this is about how emotions are understood commonly or by Deonna & Teroni.

Chapter 2 (The diversity and unity of emotions, pp. 14-27) is an analysis of distinctions within “[t]he totality of the domain of emotions” (p. 25) with the aim of looking for a possible defence of their categorial unity. Deonna & Teroni list a number of features considered as a common denominator, so to speak, of the whole class of emotions, e.g. the specific valence of an emotion (their being either positive or negative). The second section is about the contrast between conscious and unconscious emotions and includes an excellent discussion of how misleading is the category of unconsciousness (see pp. 16-17): Deonna & Teroni convincingly show that the label unconscious in relation to emotion is used inappropriately or, at the least, not literally (e.g. unconscious can mean having one’s attention not directed towards his emotion). As a result, Deonna & Teroni reject the idea of unconscious emotions, since “there always is something it is like to undergo an emotion” (p. 17). After some remarks on first- and second-order emotions and a class of moral emotions Deonna & Teroni come to the burning issue of basic emotions. Deonna & Teroni defend the unity of the category of emotion. They do so mainly by arguing against Griffiths’ position, the most prominent critic of the unity of emotion considered as a natural kind. Chapter 3 (Emotions, beliefs, and desires, pp. 28-39) contains an argument that emotions, though “motivat[ing] us in all sorts of ways” (p. 28) are distinct from desires. This is relevant insofar as emotions are often understood as cognitive states, more specifically in the sense that they are caused by events, objects or situations. Given that they are intentional phenomena, the way in which their being directed at something works merits an examination. Apparently experiencing such and such emotions is associated with representing the object of this emotion so and so. Deonna & Teroni discuss two main theories (the mixed theory and the desire satisfaction/frustration approach) and conclude that if an emotion is a specific evaluation then one should always try to explain the specificity of its occurrence, not just the occurrence itself. To this end a close link between emotion and value must be elucidated.

This is what Deonna & Teroni explore in Chapter 4 (Introducing values, pp. 40-51). The subjectivist approach as well as the fitting attitude analyses are discussed and rejected, because they understand (or reduce) evaluative properties in terms of emotions, while in fact the former are independent of the latter. If so, the natural option is to analyze emotions as judgments about value. Chapter 5 (Emotions as value judgments, pp. 52-62) is a discussion of the evaluative judgment theory, i.e. the theory in which emotions are evaluative of axiological beliefs. But, again, this theory is not satisfactory because having an evaluating belief is not the same as experiencing an emotion. More particularly the former lacks the phenomenology of the latter which is a crucial feature of emotion. The discussion then turns to the so-called add-on strategy (a position according to which an emotion is an evaluative belief accompanied by a certain phenomenology). This position cannot be accepted either, since it does not sufficiently explain “the fine-grained phenomenological nuances of emotions” (p. 57). Finally, a reverse, equally unsatisfactory, solution of taking emotions as constructs (i.e. an emotion as feeling accompanied by a judgment) is discussed.

Chapter 6 (Perceptual theories of the emotions, pp. 63-75) is a discussion of the James-Lange theory. This approach is criticized mainly by way of pointing out to differences between perceptions and emotions (e.g. emotions are valences which is not the case of perceptions but also because while we ask for reasons of emotions, we do not ask for reasons of perceptions). The Neo-Jamesian theory is not accepted by Deonna & Teroni either since its combination of phenomenological, intentional and epistemological elements does not account for the specificity of a given emotion. In Chapter 7 (The attitudinal theory of emotions, pp. 76-90) these constrains are met in another way, i.e. by approaching emotion as an attitude towards an object, more precisely as a felt bodily stance directed towards the object. Emotions are as distinct as these attitudes can be. The advantage of this approach is, for instance, that it “treats bodily feelings as constitutive of the emotions and not as consequences of them” (p. 81). This also explains the relation between emotions and desires. Since emotions are attitudes, they motivate desires rather than being formed by them.

Chapter 8 (Emotions and their justification, pp. 91-103) develops an account of justified emotions. Typically, the justification of emotions is answered either by pointing out to their cognitive bases or by referring to the subject’s motivational states. Yet, as it seems, the cognitive basis of an emotion does not bring about a judgement or an intuition of value. This is because a subject can well be aware of an evaluative property and yet it is still possible that it is not instantiated by a corresponding emotion. Chapter 9 (The nature and role of affective explanations, pp. 104-117) addresses the second option: it deals with the subject’s motivational states as well as the epistemological impact of these motivational states on emotions. Among the motivational states there are mood and temperaments on the on hand and character traits and sentiments on the other. However, while they all can explain why such and such emotion occurs, only the latter can justify its occurrence. On the other hand while all of them can distort emotions, this is not always so, as in some cases when sentiment and character traits “do not play a distorting effect, they can constitute justificatory reasons for the emotions they explain” (p. 113).

Chapter 10 (The importance of emotions, pp. 118-125) starts with what is meant to be a definition of emotions, considered as “attitudes that depend epistemologically on the content of the states that function as their cognitive bases” (p. 118).  Deonna & Teroni’s main claim is that “emotions constitute privileged sources of justification of the evaluative judgements they explain” (p. 118). The idea is that in order to evaluate the environment correctly we need emotional sensitivity. This recalls, to some extent at least, Heidegger’s claim that the world is revealed to us only when in a special Stimmung (Heidegger is another name absent from the book). The chapter contains most welcome claims, yet some of them are not sufficiently explained. For example: what does it mean that “we are emotional creatures” (p. 123)? Such a statement about “the fact” hardly complies with the rigorous tone of the book. Again when the chapter ends with a remark on “our emotional engagement with the world” and on “emotions that constitute an epistemologically privileged route for our knowledge of value” (p. 124), I wonder to what extent it is an echo of a Scheler or Heidegger.

To sum up: the book offers an ambitious and detailed summary and discussion of some important debates on emotions. At the same time it is so succinct that on several occasions I would ask for arguments being more supported or illustrated by examples. For sure, the book is stimulating and a much longer review would be possible (let me tell that first I have written this review much longer, with a critical discussion included). What I missed the most is any mention of a hierarchical approach. This is all the more important that the first and the last chapters could have benefited from this approach a lot: especially by linking Deonna & Teroni’s approach to the holistic view which is, at least in my opinion, touched upon only implicitly.

© 2013 Robert Zaborowski

Robert Zaborowski, thymos2001@yahoo.fr, University of Warmia and Mazury & Polish Academy of Sciences