Antonio Damasio is a best-selling author, and
it is not hard to see why.  This is a
work of pop science, valuable in its own right.  While it is not particularly ground breaking it is an accessible
and attention-grabbing work about how we come to know that a feeling occurs
within the boundaries of our own organism. 
That is, how feelings and emotions bring about a sense of Self and,
therefore, consciousness.

David Chalmers coined the term the ‘Hard
Problem’ of consciousness to refer to this issue of experience, the subjective
aspect of sight, touch, smell, taste and sound, to attempt to account not for
the experience, but for what it is to have
the experience. To explain the sense of Self that is integral to sensory input,
what it is for me to see, for
example.  This is commonly referred to
as qualia and according to Damasio is
part of the problem of how we have mental images of objects (which might include
reactions, feelings, intentions or memories of whatever that ‘object’ might
be).  This is the first of the two
‘Problems of Consciousness’ which Damasio sets as the central target of his
investigation. The second problem being how we know that we have a mental image
of an object.

The solution of the first problem requires an
insight into how the brain turns neural patterns and chemical signals into
mental representations of the object of our attention.  Philosophically speaking the solution requires
an explanation of qualia.  What it is
for me to have a mental
representation of the object of my attention.

Solving the
second problem requires that we understand how a mental representation is
sensed as being held or entertained within the boundaries of our organism.  That is, how we recognise our own mental
property.  Biologically, the problem is
how the brain entertains an image while concurrently entertaining the sense of
a Self who is engaged in that entertaining.

It is the second problem that Damasio tackles
head on, claiming that any biological processes that enable us to know that we
are entertaining mental representations will also play a role in the process by
which we come to have those representations. 
As such Damasio side-steps the ‘Hard Problem’ of Consciousness by
looking at how we recognise a state rather than how we come to have the state.

Damasio uses investigations into neural
anatomy and in particular the effects of damage to different regions of the
brain, to determine which parts of the brain have particular significance for
consciousness.  By determining which
areas of the brain are responsible for consciousness a neural anatomy of
consciousness can be developed which will indicate the areas in which to
investigate how the brain entertains images of an object in correspondence with
a sense of Self.

The case studies used to illustrate and
investigate these issues are taken from previously published works and as such
will not reveal anything new to anyone studying the psychology of consciousness.  They do, however, help the non-specialist
reader by providing fairly detailed examples of disorders, and offer an
opportunity for terminology to be explained in context.  Damasio’s neural experimentation generates a
number of claims about consciousness. The most significant for the course of
the book is that consciousness itself can be split into two.  Damasio identifies two levels of
consciousness, Core and Extended.  Core
consciousness involves an awareness of Self but only in the here and now.  With Core Consciousness there is no link
between the Self in the present and the Self in the past.  Nor are there any intentions for the
future.  Extended Consciousness on the other
hand involves the idea of an Autobiographical Self with a sense of identity
over time and the associated memories and intentions.

Damasio also claims that Consciousness (here
and elsewhere the use of ‘Consciousness’ refers to Extended Consciousness) has
survived on an evolutionary scale because the ability to entertain objects of
thought, both in their own right and in relation and concurrently with ideas of
self, helps the organism maintain itself. 

Another discovery unearthed by the
neurological investigation is the inseparability of consciousness and
emotion.  Damasio considers emotion to
be bodily changes and the feeling of an emotion as the experience of those
changes.  The importance of emotion and
Consciousness for bodily maintenance is based in the idea that Consciousness
involves having an idea of the Self and an (external) object and feeling an
emotion involves experiencing the change that object produces in the
organism.  If this change is positive or
pleasurable then there is no problem. However, the usefulness of the combination
of these faculties becomes evident when we consider the negative or unpleasant
changes and subsequent emotions which make the organism aware of the need for
stability and safety, and if necessary may cause the organism to change its
relationship to the object. 

Consciousness is therefore the ‘Feeling of What Happens‘ when we
interact with something, which is then represented within the organism by the
brain.

This is an interesting and entertaining
work.  It is written in a slightly
conflicted style, with use of both potentially throwaway sound-byte and
technical neurological jargon.  The
frequency and number of case studies keeps the tone light, and certainly adds
some real life interest to what could be fairly complicated subject matter.

© 2003 Mary Hodson

Mary Hodgson has just finished an MA in
philosophy at the University of Bristol. 
Her dissertation discussed the interdependent nature of emotion and
perception in relation to art.

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology