In The Myth of the Moral Brain, Harris Wiseman presents a compelling argument that proponents of moral enhancement often exaggerate or misconstrue our understanding of the human brain when arguing for biomedical interventions designed to improve an agent’s morality.  Roughly, he argues that the human brain and the human decision making process is complex, and given contemporary scientific evidence many biomedical interventions would be unlikely to achieve the goals of proponents of moral enhancement.  However, Wiseman contends that moral enhancement is both possible and desirable, arguing that we already embrace some forms of what he calls soft moral enhancement — non-explicit means of making people act in more desirable ways, often by creating more desirable social patterns, and that some hard moral enhancement, or explicit interventions designed to improve moral functioning, would be acceptable on a noncompulsory, individual basis.

          After a compelling introductory chapter that outlines many of the problems associated with the moral enhancement debate, the book is divided into five sections, with all but the last containing two chapters.  In section I Wiseman critically evaluates several arguments for moral enhancement and argues that they face serious conceptual and practical problems.  In section II Wiseman continues to erode the justification of calls for moral enhancement by discussing the science surrounding the biomedical interventions advocated by some proponents of moral enhancement, arguing that science offers conflicting results and that there are systematic problems with some philosopher’s understanding and application of scientific data.  Section III explores whether moral enhancement is compatible with some religious conceptions of morality.  In section IV Wiseman discusses a particular target for moral enhancement — addiction, briefly dealing with the treatment/enhancement distinction and arguing that some biomedical interventions may be useful, and thus desirable, in treating addiction.  In Section V — the conclusion — Wiseman discusses two realistic approaches to moral enhancement that he believes to be feasible — Indirect, soft moral enhancement from the state — a practice he contends we already embrace (for example: seatbelt laws and the taxation of tobacco) and direct, hard moral enhancement on an individual level.  Wiseman cautions against possible abuses, but argues that the possibility of abuse does not rule out the prima facie desirability of moral enhancement.

          The debate concerning moral enhancement and biomedical interventions is quite large, but Wiseman succeeds in making substantive contributions to this debate.  First, and perhaps most importantly, he successfully shows that in many contemporary arguments for moral bioenhancement there is a fundamental disconnect between what the philosopher wants an intervention to do, and what it would realistically do.  Most notably, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that compulsory biomedical moral enhancement is necessary for preventing wrong-doers from cataclysmically abusing technology.  Wiseman succinctly argues that this is unrealistic; contemporary biomedical interventions would be incapable of changing behavior reliably or to the extent that Persson and Savulescu contend would be required to avert the end of the world as they foresee it.  Furthermore, even if existing biomedical interventions could achieve such a goal, making them compulsory and ensuring that everyone is so “enhanced” is morally problematic and politically infeasible.

          Wiseman’s discussion of desirable practical biomedical interventions concerning addiction in chapter 8 and 9 is interesting.  Addiction is, in many respects, a serious harm — both to the individual and to society — and he embraces paternalistic social engineering practices and targeted biomedical interventions (referred to as “soft moral enhancement”) as a means to curb these harms.  The addict is made better off if his addiction is treated or suppressed, and society is better off with fewer addicts.

          Despite these contributions, Wiseman fails to offer a satisfactory metaethical analysis of moral enhancement.  There is substantive philosophical disagreement in contemporary ethics about what would constitute genuine moral enhancement; Wiseman opts to largely circumvent this discussion and defines biomedical moral enhancement in an open-ended way:

Some technological or pharmacological means of affecting the biological aspects of moral functioning, to boost what is desirable, or remove what is problematic. (6)

The problem with this definition is that it is ambiguous about what moral enhancement is supposed to enhance.  In “On Defining Moral Enhancement:  A Clarifactory Taxonomy,” Raus et al. distinguish between two accounts of moral enhancement — (1) behavior-oriented accounts that seek to enhance the desirability of agents behavior, and (2) capacities-oriented accounts that seek to enhance an individual’s capacity to make more successful moral deliberations.  Interventions that enhance the capacities related to moral deliberation — rationality, attentiveness, creativity, practical wisdom, and the like — would likely lead to an agent being more successful in their moral goals, however interventions aimed at bringing about more desirable behavior need not bother benefiting the agent at all.  Wiseman discusses a series of “horrific” interventions practiced in the past and justified as means of moral enhancement — lobotomization, sterilization, segregation, and the systematic killing of people judged to be undesirable. (5)  Note these satisfy both Wiseman’s umbrella conception of moral enhancement and the behavior-oriented account, but fail to satisfy the capacities-oriented account.

          The behavior-oriented account of moral enhancement is absurd.  Suppose a warlord is coming to raid your village — undesirable.  Suppose you offer the warlord a bribe if he spares your village.  If the warlord accepts, the bribe satisfies the behavior-oriented account of moral enhancement but it would be quite absurd to say that you’ve morally enhanced the warlord.  Now suppose that instead of a bribe, you implant the warlord with a device that makes him fall asleep every time he thinks about raiding villages.  This biomedical interventions leads to a more desirable outcome by affecting the biological aspects of moral functioning… bypassing them entirely… however, again, it’s absurd to say that you’ve enhanced the warlord.  You haven’t made him a better person, you’ve just made him an impotent warlord.  Such interventions are often morally justifiable, but it doesn’t make sense to call them moral enhancement because the person being targeted is not enhanced.  Similarly, Wiseman’s soft moral enhancement proposals may lead to good outcomes, but don’t actually make anyone better.

          Conclusion:  This book is worth reading.  Wiseman’s critical evaluation of key arguments in favor of moral bioenhancement is concise and effective, and his proposals regarding treating addiction and social nudging are make a substantial contribution to the applied bioethics.

References:

Raus, K.; Focquaert, F.; Schermer, M.; Specker, J.; and Sterckx, S. 2014.  On defining moral enhancement, a clarificatory taxonomy [Raus et al.] Neuroethics 7(3): 263-273

© 2016 William Simkulet

William Simkulet, Ph.D., University of Wisonsin, Marshfield/Wood County