The past decades have seen a fair amount of publications in the philosophy of biology (e.g., Hull & Ruse, 1998, 2007; Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999; Garvey, 2007; Sober, 1999, 2006; Sarkar & Plutynski, 2008) and one might ask: “Did we really need another anthology?” Michael Ruse’s volume answers this affirmatively mainly by incorporating several contributions in areas that have been rarely touched on in previous volumes. In addition he also offers a fair amount of ‘familiar staple’ of the field. The 25 chapters, written by senior and experienced as well as exciting young scholars, provide a good overview of an exiting and constantly evolving field of research. There is no formal division into subsections but “a broad move from more epistemological questions … to more social questions about the implications of the life sciences for living in society” (p. 4).

Given the length limitations of a book review I cannot do justice to all contributions here. Instead I will provide some detail about two chapters and give a very brief summary for the rest. My choice was based on personal interest and does in no way reflect on the quality of the chapters I do not discuss in detail. Chapter 16 (Karen Neander, Teleological theories of mental content: can Darwin solve the problem of intentionality?) explores different philosophical theories that attempt to illuminate how Darwinian natural selection could account for intentionality. The main focus of those theories is on the philosophical problem of intentionality. Neander offers a short introduction of the topic, touching on issues of (biological) function, teleofunctionalism and normativity.  She discusses in (as she admits) very broad stokes the philosophical treatment of indicator teleosemantics (Dretske), consumer-based teleosomantics (Millikan), and desire-first teleosomantics (Papineau). These cartoons offer a helpful entry in a very complex field and encourage critical engagement with the views of these authors. Given the importance of semantics for all accounts it would have been desirable to add at least some reference to work in linguistics that should inform philosophy (e.g., Evans, 2009; Heim, 1992; Higginbotham, 2007; Krifka & Fery, 2008). I did not think the extended discussion of the swampman objections added anything valuable. Pace Neander I do not believe that swamp-creatures are “consistent with the laws of nature and hence… a nomological possibility” (p. 403). Instead, these creatures usually are exploited in support of a view already held and should be retired from serious philosophical discussion.

Chapter 24 (Carla Fehr, Feminist philosophy of biology) is interesting because it highlights the good and the not so good of recent feminist scholarship. Let me begin with the good. Fehr shows “that feminist and non-feminist philosophy of biology are complementary endeavors” (p. 570) and that feminist work has made important contributions to both biology and the philosophy of biology. This has been possible, because feminists have challenged long accepted claims about the universality of biological facts and misleading metaphors in the natural sciences. The resulting reconceptualization had important implications for medical research (e.g., work in endocrinology, neurobiology and genetics) and our understanding of sexual behavior (e.g., Hrdy’s work on primates). This work has clearly shown that the inclusion of different perspectives is beneficial for scientific and philosophical progress and that feminist contributions can help to “maximize the accuracy of biological knowledge claims and the clarity of biological concepts (p. 580). The not so good is a somewhat repetitive bemoaning of marginalization, sexism, androcentrism, and domination metaphors. As it is unlikely that someone who still does not acknowledge the problems arising from Beacon’s ‘dominating nature’ metaphor or Darwin’s Victorian picture of sexual selection hardly will accept them based on Fehr’s simplistic sketch. And, for the (hopefully large) majority of readers who already accept these points, Fehr may create the wrong impression that feminist work has not made much progress in recent decades. Overall it would be desirable for feminists to emphasize more their accomplishments and sound less ‘desperate’, especially in a volume whose editor encourages the readers to “get excited, get involved, have fun” (p. 10. my emphasis). Surely, a lot work remains to be done, but usually one accomplishes more when one has some fun doing it. And, looking back at history (and more recently herstory), it is worth noting that we have come along a great distance in a very short period of time.

The remaining contributions span an impressive range of topics indeed. David Hull’s opening chapter sketches the history of the field. Though he traces this history back to Aristotle most of the chapter focuses, somewhat regrettably, on the English-speaking world. Evolutionary theory still is a main focus of philosophy of biology and Michael Ruse gives a good primer to central issues in evolutionary theory, especially natural selection. Other authors cover familiar themes such as population dynamics and statistical methods to study evolution, optimality models of adaptive fitness, evolvability, essentialism and biological classification, the role of chance and genetic drift, gradualism/saltationalism, units of selection and genetics, and recent developments in ‘evo-devo’ thinking and debates following the completion of the human genome project. In addition some more recently added themes of philosophy of biology are given the space they deserve. For example Lisa Gannett discusses some of the ethical and social implications that follow from the wide availability of genetic information and highlights concerns about genetic discrimination and the ownership of genetic information. Robin Andreasen discusses biological and social constructivist theories of race and implications for using ‘race’ as variable in biomedical research from a scientific and ethical perspective. Other chapters concern debates about ecology and the environment, biotechnology and genetically modified food, the philosophy of neuroscience, animal behavior, the relationship between biological sciences and religious beliefs, and the role of metaphors for scientific rhetoric.

Obviously even a 600+ page volume cannot cover adequately all areas relevant to the philosophy of biology. One omission I found quite regrettable was the almost complete absence of language evolution. The only very brief discussion of this fascinating topic was in Matteo Mameli chapter Sociobiology, Evolutionary Psychology, and Cultural Evolution. But he devoted the two pages he spent on the ‘irrelevant evolution’ almost exclusively to the discussion of Chomsky’s controversial UG-theory and his rather implausible saltationist language evolution account. Considering the recent rich multi-disciplinary literature on this topic (e.g., Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Tallerman, 2005; Hurford, 2007; Tomasello, 2008; Corballis, 2009; Fitch, 2010) it would be highly desirable to add a chapter by one of the many experts in this field to future edition. Presumably other readers will have similar concerns about their “favorite subject” and not everyone might be happy with the selection of the chapters that were included in the volume. However, overall, Ruse provides an interesting and challenging selection of the work that is currently debated in the philosophy of biology and the book is certainly a valuable addition to already existing material. I hope that many students will follow the invitation to “read, learn, disagree, get excited, get involved [and] have fun” (p. 10).

 

 

References

 

Christiansen, M., & Kirby, S. (Eds.), (2003). Language Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Corballis, M. (2009). The evolution of language. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1156, 19-43.

Evans, V. (2009). How Words Mean: Lexical concepts, cognitive models and meaning construction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fitch, T. (2010). The Evolution of Language. Cambridge University Press

Garvey, B. (2007). Philosophy of Biology. Stocksfield: Acumen.

Heim, I. (1992). Presupposition Projection and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs. Journal of Semantics, 9, 183-221.

Higginbotham, J. (2006). Truth and Reference as the Basis of Meaning. In: M. Devitt & R. Hanley (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. (pp. 58–76). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Hull, D. L. & Ruse, M. (Eds.) (1998). The Philosophy of Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hull, D. L. & Ruse, M. (2007). The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hurford, J. (2007). The Origins of Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Krifka, M. & Féry, C. (2008). Information structure. Notional distinctions, ways of expression. In: P. van Sterkenburg (ed.), Unity and diversity of languages. (pp. 123-136). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Sahotra, S. & Plutynski, A. (2008). A companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Sober, E. (1999). Philosophy of Biology. Oxford: Westview Press.

Sober, E., (Ed.) (2006). Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sterelny, K. and Griffiths, P. E. (1999). Sex and Death: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Biology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tallerman, M. (Ed.) (2005). Language Origins: Perspectives on Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of human communication. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

© 2011 Christina Behme

 

Christina Behme. Ph.D., Philosophy Department, Dalhousie University