While science and technology
studies (or STS) and philosophy of science both describe and comment on issues
in the natural sciences, the relationship between the two fields is not always
clear. It is this relationship that is the subject of
Steve Fuller’s new book, The Philosophy
of Science and Technology Studies. The methods and
theories employed in STS are more characteristic of a sociology of science and
thus clarifying this relationship is an important contribution to the field. In addition to this, Fuller challenges the conflation of
the sociology of science and the sociology of knowledge, and argues for a
reworking of the relationship between the scientific community and the public
as a whole. It is an ambitious project that both
contributes to and detracts from the relationship between philosophy of science
and STS.

The book is divided into six
chapters with three main themes running through it. The
introduction of the relationship between philosophers of science and STS takes
up the first three chapters of the book. The first
chapter is a general introduction, but it also sets the scene for Fuller’s
analysis of the ‘Science Wars’ that are exemplified by the Sokal-Latour
debates surrounding the notorious Sokal Hoax in 1996. Chapter two looks at logical positivism and the
transformation of traditional concepts in
the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of science. Fuller
illustrates how Kuhn’s work in the philosophy of science had a significant
impact on the direction of the positivist movement and on the demarcation
between relativism and constructivism. The third
chapter continues to characterize the relationship between the philosophy of
science and STS, but also argues for a particular kind of relationship. Fuller asserts that philosophers of science should fill
the role of under-laborers, a concept originally introduced by Russell and
Leibniz. Chapter four marks a shift, wherein Fuller argues
for a continuity between the projects and methods of
logical positivism and postmodernism, illustrating the philosophical issues
that the postmodern tradition inherits from the positivists, and the
commonality between their goals.

Chapters five and six are related
with respect to the goals of secularizing and re-enchanting science. For example, Fuller addresses the fact that while popular
science books enjoy success, enrollment in science programs is on the decline. This leads him to the conclusion that there is a lack of
commitment to the practice and comprehension of science by the general
population. Chapter five looks that the role of STS
across intellectual changes and the need to deter the rise of Gnostic scientism,
which is characterized as the fatalistic and authoritarian extremes on the political
and sociological spectrums in scientific realms as in sociobiology and
evolutionary theory. Finally, chapter
six argues for the accountability of scientists as accomplished through ‘citizen
juries.’ This would extend
the sense of duty for the creation and maintenance of scientific knowledge, including
the ethical responsibilities in scientific research, to the general public as
well.

Fuller’s book contributes to the
literature in the following ways. He characterizes the
relationship between the philosophy of science and STS, describing their
ideological and methodological differences and explains why both fields are
necessary. He also describes the role of the public in
scientific policy making, citing examples of how citizen juries have affected the
public understanding of science, changed scientific methodologies and increased
the general awareness of the public regarding the scientific community. Furthermore, Fuller describes how these citizen juries
could have the role of reconnecting scientists and the community. This is accomplished through the focus on scientists as
humans and on the general public as critical thinkers and contributors to
science. Possible implications that follow from his
observations could easily be translated into arguments for the teaching of science,
policy making and ethics regarding scientific experiments.

Fuller’s book, however, also raises
some concerns. The first concern relates to its
accessibility to general audiences. Fuller’s treatment
of these complicated topics occasionally suffers from the concise manner with
which he treats them. Without extensive knowledge of
the STS literature, it is at time difficult to grasp the impact of some of his
claims, such as the suggested relationship between STS and the philosophy of
science, or the impact and outcome of the Sokal Hoax. A more serious critique could be made for his treatment
and representation of philosophy, which is less than charitable. While he does come from the analytic tradition himself, his
critiques of philosophy require further development if he intends to convince a
philosophical audience that they are founded. This
issue is connected to my final critique, which is that the very nature of
Fuller’s project seems paradoxical. Given the
differences between the philosophy of science and STS and given the highly
mitigated position he offers philosophy (as under-laborer), it is not always clear
why he argues for a philosophy of science and technology studies. He is successful in his distinction between STS and the philosophy
of science –attributing a descriptive role to STS and a normative role to the
philosophy of science– and yet he does not explicitly connect the two such that
a philosophy of science and technology studies has been described or its methods
made clear.

Overall, Fuller presents the
sociological perspective of natural sciences carefully and draws important and
often overlooked distinctions between the descriptive and normative
methodological features in this field. While his
approach to the topic and extensive research reveals the expertise he has in
this area, this book may be more appropriate for an academic audience already
well versed in the philosophy of science and in science and technology studies.

© 2006 Shereen Hassanein

Shereen Hassanein is currently finishing her PhD in philosophy at York University
in Toronto in
philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. She is
also currently doing research in language acquisition and autism research at
the Milton and
Ethel Harris Research Initiative.

Categories: Philosophical