The Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific Mind aims at nothing less than launching a new field of scientific inquiry: the psychology of science. Gregory Feist having received his PhD himself as one of first specializing in this area has founded also a journal and an international society for the psychology of science.

The psychology of science may accompany the history of science and the sociology of science as a new meta-science. In distinction to these and the broader philosophy of science the psychology of science is a meta-science which uses the empirical methods of psychology.

The book is divided into two major parts: the psychology of science proper, and the origins of the scientific mind in the human species.

The latter part summarizes some anthropological theories on the development of the human mind. The notion of 'science' employed here, however, is very broad (including 'implicit science' in the tool use of early hominids). Feist is at one point (p. 208) clearly aware that this notion of science does not cover science in the strict sense (of pure, explicit, mathematical, experimental and systematic science, which arose only once – in the beginning of the modern era in Europe), i.e. the science dealt with in the first part of the book. The second part also does not take up on the recent speculations in the cognitive sciences about a special science faculty/module in the mind. Feist rather stresses our expertise in various areas (like 'folk physics', 'folk psychology' etc.).

Far more interesting, therefore, is the longer first part of the book. Here Feist reviews his own and others' work in the beginning psychology of science, and work in related areas of psychology which could be understood as being part of the psychology of science.

The psychology of science looks at science from the perspective of the sub disciplines of psychology (i.e. personality psychology, social, developmental or cognitive psychology).

Feist devotes a chapter each to these sub disciplines. With respect to developmental aspects Feist supports "a mild form of recapitulation: the development of the species is reflected in the development of the individual" (71). Factors in developing an interest in science seem to be: being open to new/alternative ideas, introverted, organized. Age does not play a great role either in productivity nor in changing one's mind about a theory.

The social and personality psychology of science reveal the contrast of a scientist's working life to the cherished values of impartial scientific method. Recognition by one's peers early in one's career plays a great role in allocating resources and further esteem: "having an eminent mentor appears to be a contributing factor in obtaining eminence" (131). The book contains some nicely cynic remarks on the 'shark basin' that science departments can be, and the vicissitudes of career building (by quantity of publications, and so forth): "success is more likely for those who thrive in competitive environments, that is, for the dominant, arrogant, hostile and self-confident" (123).

Some of the supposed results are amusing (like the question whether 'arrogance' is a personality trait the presence of which distinguishes 'eminent' scientist from ordinary scientist before or only after they became 'eminent'). Some of the supposed results are sobering (like the observation that training in scientific methods has less effect on (correlation with) methodological conscientiousness than previous character traits).

Feist, further on, proposes applying the psychology of science in schools and universities: "perhaps a psychology of science can have a loud and clear voice about selection criteria for potential graduate students and faculty" (33). This may await its future development.

Sometimes the results and theses of the psychology of science sound a lot like platitudes (e.g. scientist being especially 'conscientious', being focused on confronting hypotheses with data, and so forth). But platitudes born out by empirical research are confirmed/reflected platitudes. And in any case this isn't Feist's fault, but highlights the nascent state of the psychology of science, and how much the philosophy of science needs a supplementation by a working psychology of science.

© 2008 Manuel Bremer

Manuel Bremer, University of Düsseldorf, Germany

Keywords: psychology, science