The Philosophy of Psychology, as a subject area, is not altogether easy to define. I can think of at least three ways that one might define it. First, as a branch of the Philosophy of Science: i.e., something like a second-order inquiry into the methodological assumptions and findings of Psychology and its neighbouring academic disciplines. Second, as a branch of the Philosophy of Mind: i.e., something like a first-order enquiry into what Hume called the “secret springs and principles” of the mind. Third, as an area of Psychology itself, just the more theoretical end, standing to experimental psychology as theoretical physics does to experimental physics. 

This volume takes a self-consciously broad approach to its subject matter, and so encompasses all three of those conceptions of the Philosophy of Psychology within its pages. What it lacks in methodological focus, it more than makes up for in the breadth and depth of its coverage (almost 800 pages worth in total!). Not only do we get articles on the usual subjects (e.g., computationalism, modularity, nativism, the extended mind, etc), we also are treated to some worthwhile exotica (e.g., the Psychology of Plants, Buddhism and Philosophy, and Conceptual Problems in Statistics, Testing and Experimentation). 

This is the 2nd edition of the volume. Like its predecessor, it is split into six parts, which make up a broad but slightly motley crew: (1 – Historical Background; 2 – Psychological Explanation; 3 – Cognition and Representation; 4 – The Biological Basis of Psychology; 5 – Perceptual Experience; 6 – Personhood). The chapters are, for the most part, written by acknowledged experts in their respective areas, and each chapter is, without fail, informative, well written and interesting. 

Nevertheless, despite the evident quality of the entries here, readers might want to approach the volume with some caution. The majority of the chapters (42 of the 48) appear unaltered from the 2009 1st edition. As a result, one is left reading, for example, that qualia is currently “all the rage” in Philosophy and Psychology (p. 71), which feels a bit like being told that The Beatles are a hot new band to watch out for. Likewise, at various points there are recommendations to read recent books or articles on a topic, but which, on further inspection, turn out to be from, say, 2006 (p. 294). For all but the newly commissioned articles, the references tend to peter out at about 2006 or 2007, leaving the impression, within such a fast-moving field, that the volume is not quite at the cutting-edge of things. Perhaps it is a lot to ask for substantive re-writes of these chapters; but I did wonder whether some of them would have benefitted from a new section at the end just to bring the reader up to date with recent advances (or, failing that, perhaps just a short set of recommended readings on new advances).  

Given the above, I shall focus the main part of this review on the six newly commissioned chapters, all of which are well-judged invitations and welcome additions, that some readers might judge to be worth the price of admission on their own.

Lessen, Tinklenberg and Andrews’ excellent chapter (‘Belief and Representation in Nonhuman Animals’) is a very neatly structured and informative overview of current thinking on the capacity for thought within (nonhuman) animals. The chapter considers representational and non-representational accounts of animal belief in turn, providing clear and non-partisan summaries of the leading ideas within the area, and then relates the philosophical debates to work in the empirical sciences, including comparative psychology. One is unlikely to find anywhere a clearer, more succinct and better-informed summary of the area than this. 

Kiefer and Hohwy’s chapter (‘Representation in the Prediction Error Minimization Framework’) is an important addition, discussing one of the major developments within Cognitive Science over the last decade or so, sometimes known, in broad terms, as the ‘Predictive Mind’ or ‘predictive processing’. Hohwy himself has been at the forefront of much of the philosophical work in this area, and it is specifically his PEM framework that the chapter is concerned with elucidating. Although not always easy going – primarily due to its necessarily technical subject matter – it is detailed and informative, providing the reader with a sense of the PEM framework’s potential as a model of perceptual and/or cognitive representation (the authors regard it as providing a model of representation as structural similarity to what is represented). It also provides the reader with plenty of useful references to follow up some of the key ideas, and a sense of a thriving research programme. Of the three versions of the ‘Philosophy of Psychology’ mentioned at the start of this review, it is very much the third – of the Philosophy of Psychology as the theoretical branch of Psychology itself – which is on display in this chapter. 

William Bechtel’s chapter (‘Networks and Dynamics: Twenty-First-Century Neuroscience’) compares both the network analysis and the dynamic analysis of brain functions, to more traditional mechanistic explanations. The latter describe a linear feedforward process – of straightforward “start to termination conditions” (p. 466) – while the former describe a much more complex, nonlinear matrix of cycles and recurrent feedback loops that are best captured within mathematical or kinematic models, or via direct simulation. Although not necessarily in competition, according to Bechtel mechanistic explanations need to be supplemented with the dynamical/network analyses which are “better suited to recognise the multiplicity of interactions and the complex dynamics” that occur in mechanistic processes. The chapter is very lucidly written and provides a good sense of a living debate regarding methodology at the borderline between psychology and neuroscience,  and exemplifies the first of our definitions of the Philosophy of Psychology, as a second-order enquiry into the methodology of psychological explanation.

Heras-Escribano and Calvo’s chapter (‘The Philosophy of Plant Neurobiology’) is intriguing, and not just because of its seemingly niche subject matter. The authors recount various ways in which plants exhibit sophisticated, intelligent-like responses to their environment, including sensing, acting, communicating, anticipating, learning and problem-solving. Of course, a sceptic will likely provide a reductive – as opposed to cognitive or mentalistic – explanation for these responses, but the authors make a good case for taking plant physiology on its own terms, suggesting we should consider without prejudice the idea that plants can exhibit meaningful intelligent behaviour, and argue that in doing so we will ultimately come to a better “understanding of the nature of cognition as a natural phenomenon of living beings…[and of] the natural origins of cognition” (p. 545). In all, this makes for a well-argued and thought-provoking article.

Jennifer Nagel and Jessica Wright’s elegantly written chapter (‘The Psychology of Epistemic Judgement’) takes a different approach to some of the others mentioned here. While, for instance, Kiefer and Hohwy begin by considering the empirical evidence, and then work their philosophical ideas around those, Nagel and Wright begin with a discussion of the philosophical literature on belief and knowledge attribution and then ask how such attributions are implemented at a psychological and neurological level. This chapter exemplifies the second of our definitions of the Philosophy of Psychology, taking it as a first-level inquiry into the ‘secret springs and principles’ that (in this case) enable psychological attribution to, and epistemic evaluation of, others. There is a detailed and up-to-date discussion of the developmental psychology literature on false belief and knowledge attribution, as well as short sections on epistemic vigilance, and epistemic injustice. Although the material here is quite wide-ranging, the chapter does well to highlight the various ways in which core issues in epistemology make contact with issues in psychology and neuroscience, and anyone working in this area would find a lot to here to get their teeth into and follow up on. 

Finally, Tollefsen and Ryan’s chapter (‘Group Cognition’) tackles one of the biggest growth areas in contemporary philosophy. It is a model of clarity and structure, providing the reader with a good sense not just of the contemporary debates about group cognition, but also of its history in Ancient Roman thought, as well as early sociological thought of the 19th Century. The chapter is even-handed, placing, for instance, Tollefsen’s own substantive work on transactive memory systems (a form of a socialised extended mind), alongside functionalist approaches to group cognition, as well as emergentist theories. There is also an excellent section on objections to the ‘Group Mind Hypothesis’, with well-judged replies. Anyone reading this chapter – even those who know something of the area – will leave feeling better informed about the area, as well as getting a sense of where it might develop next. 

In summary, the articles in this volume are all of a very high standard. However, if one was asking who the volume might be for, it is a little difficult to answer. Many of the entries are too difficult or technical to act as the central readings on a lower-level Philosophy of Psychology course, and yet are not up-to-date enough to be the central readings on a higher-level postgraduate Philosophy of Psychology course. Certainly, many of the entries would be very useful as supplementary material on either of those types of courses, so course instructors might well want to get hold of a copy for that reason for themselves or their library. Researchers or advanced students working within Philosophy of Psychology, might find the volume as a whole useful, especially for the newer entries mentioned above, although the older entries too will continue to be useful for researchers or advanced students who are aware that the debates have moved on in some instances.    

 Dr Michael Wilby, Anglia Ruskin University

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology

Keywords: philosophy of psychology