In The Vehement
Passions Philip Fisher sets out to show that the passions play an
imperative role in providing us with certain valuable information about the
world. For this reason Fisher is throughout his book critical of philosophers
and other thinkers (from the Stoics onwards) who assert that the passions (like
bodily diseases) are best rid off, and therefore primarily a matter for
therapeutic intervention.

Chapters One to
Six largely focus on what Fisher considers to be some of the salient features
of passion (as perhaps opposed to emotion, feeling, or mood) – so, for
instance, passions, Fisher claims, are ‘modeled’ on fear and anger, are
‘isolated, free-standing states’ (that is, they do not admit of opposites), may
‘block’ other passions (anger, for example, blocks fear), will often lead to
other passions (fear, for example, often gives rise to shame), are best
described as ‘thorough’ states (they possess the self completely, are not
receptive to ambivalence, they blind the subject to demands made by others),
are public states (they are expressed immediately, not a matter of choice),
relate only to the immediate past or imminent future (for example, we feel
mourning for a death we have learnt has just occurred), are ‘strongly marked by
an appropriate duration’ (for example, mourning ended too quickly is not
mourning at all), and are states that give rise to rash and irreparable acts
(for example, a curse or an act of murder in the case of anger). In these
chapters (and throughout the book) Fisher draws heavily on philosophy (in
particular Aristotle and Hume) and literature (in particular, Homer and
Shakespeare).

In the second half of The Vehement Passions
Fisher seeks to develop some of his more substantial claims, focusing primarily
on the passions of fear, anger, and grief. Fisher devotes two chapters to the
study of fear. In the first chapter Fisher distinguishes between what he calls
the ‘forward-looking economic model of fear’ (which is basically Robert
Nozick’s ‘general anticipatory fear’) from the ‘backward-looking legal model of
fear’ (which Fisher claims involves a fear experience concluding in a verdict:
coward or hero), and in the next chapter Fisher seeks to show how the
backward-looking model of fear is relevant to aesthetics and the law. It should
be said, however, that I found a number of claims made in both chapters very
difficult to follow – and, in particular, it struck me that Fisher’s backward-looking
model of fear may have confused the experience of fear with the events (say,
the choice of fight or flight, and consequent verdict) that often follow on
from that experience (cf. pp 117-119). The chapters on anger and grief I found
to be more coherent and cogent. In these chapters Fisher develops in detail his
claim that the passions have an essential role to play because they reveal
certain important information about the (agent’s) world. So, drawing heavily on
Aristotle, Fisher argues that feeling anger informs us that an injustice has
been committed (or that we have been slighted in some way), and also the extent
to which the person who has angered us matters to us (for we generally only
feel anger if we value the other person or his opinions). And in the case of
grief Fisher argues that by experiencing (or failing to experience) grief we
also come to realise who is (or is not) important to us.

The Vehement
Passions is not an easy book to read. Insufficient attention, I believe, has been paid
to ensuring clarity of argument and linguistic expression. Moreover, a number
of Fisher’s claims often seem brashly or strongly stated, but insufficiently
argued for. So, for example, Fisher seems to simply assert rather than argue
for the claim that only the passions – and not reason or calm reflection – can
give us certain knowledge about the world (cf. p194). Nevertheless, Fisher does
make a number of interesting and thought-provoking claims about the passions
(often backed up with appropriate and enjoyable literary examples), and this
book should therefore be of some interest to those seeking to understand what
the passions are and whether they can give us valuable knowledge about the
world.

© 2002 Demian Whiting

Demian
Whiting was awarded a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Sheffield in
March 2002. His research interests lie in the areas of emotion,
psychopathology, and applied ethics. Demian is the author of ‘Emotional
Disorder’, Ratio, forthcoming.

Categories: Philosophical