According to Schroeder’s introduction ‘desire’ has received
(too) little attention in recent philosophical work.  He suggests that the two widely accepted theories of desire (the
Standard Theory and the Hedonic Theory) are flawed and that he has ‘a radical
new theory’ (p. 6) to offer. Schroeder combines the results of recent
neuroscientific research and philosophical considerations to convince the reader
that his theory can account for desire as well as the dominant theories, and
that his theory can also account for additional aspects of desire The first
chapter introduces the most widely accepted philosophical theories of desires,
Schroeder’s objections to them and a brief sketch of his own theory. Chapters 2
to 4 give detailed accounts of the three faces of desire: motivation, pleasure,
and reward. Schroeder explains common sense notions, familiar philosophical
debates, and he provides a wealth of data from recent neuroscientific research.
A common theme emerges: the dominant theories are found defective under the
intense scrutiny of common sense expectations and scientific results while
Schroeder’s own (not yet fully explicated) theory can account better for the
data provided. This prepares the ground for chapter 5, the introduction and
defense of Schroeder’s own theory of desire. In Chapter 6 Schroeder puts his
theory to the test and attempts to establish that desires are a natural kind
and that reward alone is the essential face of desire.

Schroeder’s
intended audience are philosophers and scientists and like any book written to
address more than one group of experts it runs the risk of addressing neither.
I believe Schroeder has skillfully avoided this potential pitfall and provided
an interesting and comprehensive work that should initiate much discussion and
further work. The scientist may appreciate the results of his work in a broader
context. And the philosopher will undoubtedly profit from an infusion of
immensely relevant scientific data into her work. A word of caution is in place
however: philosophers who are not familiar with the scientific literature that
Schroeder analyzes should not rely exclusively on his evaluations. Some of the
results he cites are still preliminary and not all of the data are as
supportive as he might like. I lack the expertise to give a full evaluation and
recommend Leonard Katz’ very
informative review.

The remainder of this review will
address some of the philosophical issues raised by Schroeder’s book. According
to Schroeder the Standard Theory holds that desire is motivation: a desire that P is a disposition to make it true
that P. Thus, the object of desire is a state of affairs (that P) rather than a
specific object, event, or act. Schroeder bases his critique of the dominant
theory mainly on his, not uncontroversial; focus on the propositional character
of desires in the theory. Most of his objections are based on examples designed
to show that, in cases where it seems logically impossible to bring it about
that P, one can desire that P without being disposed to bring it about that P
(e.g. one can have a desire to change the past or to never be born p.16ff). It appears
that most of Schroeder’s counter examples are aimed at a broad interpretation
of desires. On this broad interpretation wishes and even intentions are forms
of desire. But on a narrow interpretation desires are different from wishes,
hopes, wants, intentions, etc. Thus, the Standard Theory may escape most of
Schroeder’s counterexamples if it is put forward purely as a theory of desire
proper. Finally, Schroeder seems to take the Standard Theory as something put
forward as necessarily true. Instead, the theory could be put forward as
contingently true for a restricted range of cases and still be true from a
scientific and philosophical point of view. Schroeder might reply that his
theory covers a broader range and should be preferred for this very reason.

The
positive theory that Schroeder puts forward, the reward theory of desire, is
essentially a representationalist’s account of positive (or negative)
reinforcement of behaviours. Not all of the examples selected to support this
view are entirely convincing (e.g. the on-going discussion of Tourette’s
Syndrome p.124ff, 145f, 160f) because it is not clear why a theory of desire
needs account for ‘normal’ and ‘dysfunctional’ behaviours in the same way. But
overall, when we take the neuroscientific data accumulated by Schroeder at face
value, they seem to lend impressive support to his theory. One of the obvious
difficulties is the intuitive implausibility of his claim that some
representations of desire satisfaction are unconscious while accepting that: "With
functionalist and phenomenological theories of pleasure, it shares the
intuitively plausible claim that episodes of pleasure and displeasure are distinctive types of conscious
events" (p. 93). It might be possible to treat the identity claim as
analogous to the claim that water is H₂O. Someone who is conscious
of water being around him is also conscious of H₂O being around him
(because water is H₂0).
However, that does not necessarily mean that he is conscious of the H₂O
around him as being H₂O around
him, because he may not know that water is H₂O. Analogously, if
I am conscious of intense joy, then I am also conscious of a representation of
drastic increase in desire satisfaction, even though I may not be aware of it
under that description. Schroeder can maintain that pleasure and displeasure
are conscious events without being committed to the claim that in every case
the subject is aware of a representation of desire satisfaction (or
dissatisfaction) under that description.
It has been suggested, to re-state Schroeder’s
initial formulation of the theory (RTD, p.131) in the following way: When
intrinsic (positive) desires that P are formed, some conscious, some not,
internal or external stimuli S activate at a minimal level at capacities in the
sensory and association cortex or in the hypothalamus to signal the ventral
tegmental area (VTA) or the pars compacta of the substantia nigra (SNpc). These
signals result in an increase of dopamine release in VTA or Snpc. Increased
dopamine levels are registered in the orbito frontal cortex (OFC) and are
perceived by the organism, as signal should it become the case that P. The
organism will thus be reinforced (Braybrooke, 2005, e-mail communication).

Overall,
Three Faces of Desire is an
interesting contribution to the philosophical debate about the nature of
desire. The infusion of neuroscientific date should provide a new focus for
this debate. Schroeder deserves praise for directing us towards a new
understanding of the nature of desire.

(I would like to thank
the members of a reading group on Three
Faces of Desire at Dalhousie University for stimulating discussion that
lead to a deeper understanding of Schroeder’s work)

© 2005 Christina Behme

Christina Behme, MSc (1986, Biology, University Rostock,
Germany), MA (2005,
Philosophy, Dalhousie University) is currently a PhD
student in the
philosophy department at Dalhousie University, Halifax,
Nova Scotia, Canada.
Her research interests are philosophy of mind and
psychology, cognitive
science, and philosophy of language.

Categories: Philosophical