This is a long (487pp) collection of twenty essays
on the general topic of practical reasoning, aimed at giving readers a sense of
what the editor refers to as “the current state of play” in this important
field. Fifteen of the essays have been previously published, either in whole or
part. One of these,
Bernard Williams’s “Internal and External Reasons,” has had a decisive
influence on recent discussions, and is the focus of discussion for several of
the essays. The essays are uniformly
well written, presenting in clear fashion the issues of central interest in
this area of philosophy. The editor
provides a useful introductory chapter that traces some connections between the
various essays.

The readers should not expect, however, a clearly
defined field of inquiry. Practical
reasoning comes in many varieties, as the title of the work suggests. For prudential or self-interested reasoning,
the standard form would seem to be ‘I want E; my doing M is a necessary (or the
best) means to E in circumstance C; C obtains; therefore, I should (ought to)
do M’. But some of the contributors
(Michael Bratman, Candace Vogler, and Robert Brandon are among them) adopt a
paradigm in which the conclusion announces a decision of the form ‘I shall do
M’ and provide elliptical versions of the general form ‘C; therefore, I shall
do M’ (‘It is raining; therefore, I shall take my umbrella’). Several writers object to the
instrumentalist view of practical reasoning assumed when the standard form is
taken as paradigm. The most common
objection, and one that is surely correct, is that the standard form implies
that the end E is fixed, one that is not open to modification or abandonment,
and that deliberation considers only the means M. This objection is stated effectively by Christoph Fehige, Martha
Nussbaum (as part of her discussion of Plato’s Protagoras), David Schmidtz, Aurel Kolnai, and David Wiggins.

Many writers in this volume
confine themselves to prudential reasoning of the general kinds just
described. But some raise larger
questions about the extent to which the standard form can be extended to moral
reasoning. What is called the 
“internalist view” of practical reasoning advocated by Williams claims
that since we appeal to motivations (typically desires) in explaining a
person’s actions, these motivations must play a role in the reasons that the
person actually uses in deliberating about what he or she is to do. To think otherwise would divorce the reasons
we use for actions from the explanations given of them.

For prudential reasoning internalism (or what is
labeled the “Humean view”) seems plausible. 
Why did X bring his
umbrella? Because he wanted to keep dry
and believed that the umbrella was the best means is a typical reply. This suggests that the standard form
inference with a ‘want’ premiss was used by X
in deciding what to do, if not explicitly, at least part of the
background. But now suppose X keeps a promise made to Y. 
It is not obvious that there must be any motivation on the part of X that we can cite in explaining the
moral action. X may desire social approval or to curry favor with Y; he may also desire simply to do the
right thing. But we may also think that
he kept the promise because he thought this was the right thing to do, or that
it followed from some moral principle that he was convinced is true. Indeed, the moral worth of his keeping the
promise seems to require this as the reason. 
In such a case no desire is used to explain, and none need be assumed as
used in the reasoning leading to the action. 
Here a deontic inference may be used of the very different form
‘Everyone should do action A in
circumstance C; I am in C; therefore, I should do A’ in which no ‘want’ premiss
occurs. This restates the Kantian
distinction between prudential reasoning based on desires or inclinations and
moral reasoning based on some self-evident moral principle. Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill defend
in different ways this Kantian “externalist view” that prohibits extending
prudential forms to moral reasoning.

Williams provides a Postscript to his early essay in
which he provides a response to such objections. He intended, he says, to make “no attempt to exclude altruistic
or other ethical considerations from the rational agent’s subjective
motivational set” (p. 92). Indeed, when
I keep a promise it may not be a self-interested desire that motivates. I may share with others in my community a
desire for mutual trust, and realize that the rule of promise-keeping if
followed by most is necessary to achieve this trust. I may also realize that I have no grounds for making a special
exception for myself, and conclude on this basis that I should keep the
promise. Here the premiss is of the
form ‘We want E’ (‘I in common with others want a state of mutual trust’)
rather than simply ‘I want E’. O’Neill
dismisses this “heteronomous” reading of Kant that incorporates the categorical
imperative into an inference with plural ‘want’ premiss, claiming that
standards of consistency alone can be used by Kant to infer moral
conclusions. I find her reasoning
unconvincing and an attempt to secure moral reasoning as the province of
philosophical ethics. Rejecting it has
the advantage of enabling us to incorporate artists, poets, and novelists into
the enterprise, for it is they that enable us to reach consensus on ideals that
we share in common.

Space prevents mentioning other issues raised in
this valuable volume. It deserves our
careful study.

© 2002 D.S. Clarke

D. S. Clarke is a Professor Emeritus at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. His books include Practical Inferences, Principles of Semiotic, Rational Acceptance and Purpose, Sources of Semiotic, and Philosophy’s Second Revolution. He has also contributed many articles and reviews to analytical journals.
He is
Professor Emeritus, Southern Illinois University.

Categories: Philosophical