The first edition of this collection, co-edited by
Cheshire Calhoun, has been a staple text for philosophy courses on the emotions
since its publication nearly twenty years ago. 
Since then, interest in the emotions amongst Anglo-American philosophers
has steadily increased, fuelled partly by recent work in the sciences.  The appearance of this edition is to be
welcomed, and represents a major contribution to teaching resources within this
field.

The first thing that the reader familiar with the
first edition will notice is the sheer number of additions. Solomon has managed
to retain all but one of the original articles (although others have been
trimmed in size) while still keeping the book to a size that will not deter
students. The volume is deceptively slim, actually weighing in at 300-plus
pages. The other main change is the loss of the original, helpful introduction,
presumably to make room for some of the new additions.

The collection consists of four parts, each of which
has been substantially expanded, preceded by a short introduction. Together,
the selections serve to provide a good survey of the history of the study of
the emotions, starting with Aristotle and taking us right up to the present (or
1997, to be precise). It is worth noting that, unlike the first edition, the
emphasis here is very much on recent work. How welcome this is will obviously
depend upon one’s particular interests.

Solomon’s brief introductions to each selection are
particularly helpful in drawing out the connections between current
psychological theories and their philosophical precursors. They draw the
reader’s attention to similarities and disparities between theories–we can,
for example, trace the history of cognitive theories, see which hold that
emotions are essential for good reasoning and which regard them as hindering
it, and so on.

The first part covers the historical background, and
includes passages from Aristotle, the Stoics, Descartes, Spinoza and Hume. Of
these, the section on the Stoics is the only new inclusion, and comprises
passages from the early Stoics, Seneca and a critical passage from Galen. The
short passage from Seneca’s De Ira is a particularly welcome addition,
setting the tone for much later discussion of the emotions. Seneca argues that
emotions are judgments in response to natural ‘first impulses’, and thus stand
in opposition to good reasoning, which is deliberative and not reactive in this
manner.

This approach contrasts with that of Aristotle, who
holds that emotions can be both virtuous and appropriate for the situation.
Feeling angry at a genuine insult is not a ‘first impulse’–it is (or, at
least, may be) an apt response to another’s poor behavior. His account also
seeks to avoid characterizing emotions as either purely physical or purely
mental; mental states and physiological changes both have a role to play in his
picture. This excerpt, as with all of the readings in this section, should help
persuade the non-philosopher that the intelligent study of the emotions did not
start with William James.

All of the readings in this section are valuable,
and those from Aristotle and Hume are, of course, essential. The section is,
however, clearly far from exhaustive. It would have been nice to see some
excerpts from the likes of Plato and Hobbes, to name but two.  The absence of such writers from the first,
slimmer edition was entirely understandable given that each section comprised
between four and six entries. In light of the expansion of several later
sections, Part One now seems rather thin, and is all the more obviously
incomplete. I do not intend to sound overly negative–this is still a useful
introduction to certain historical theories, if not as thorough survey of the
historical literature as it might have been.

Part Two is the section most expanded, and concerns
‘the meeting of philosophy and psychology’. Here we find classic texts from Darwin,
Walter Cannon, John Dewey, and Freud, as well as an excerpt from James’ What
is an Emotion?, a key foundation of the modern study of the emotions.
Modern work is represented by Schachter and Singer, Paul Ekman, Richard
Lazarus, Nico Frijda, Catherine Lutz, and Antonio Damasio. All but the first of
these modern pieces are new additions.

Connections between the psychological and
philosophical literature are clear, and serve to demonstrate the value of both
disciplines in the study of the emotions. James’ theory, in which emotions are
perceptions of physiological changes, echoes certain aspects of Descartes’
theory. The cognitive theorist’s view that emotions are judgements can be found
in the readings from Schachter and Singer, who attempt to append this claim to
an essentially Jamesian model, and Damasio, who argues that emotions are
required for good judgment. The relevance to the Stoic view could not be
clearer. Lazarus’s account, in which emotions are appraisals of the world, is
an exemplar of a cognitive account.

The remaining two sections concern the study of the
emotions within philosophy: firstly within the Continental Tradition, and then
within the broadly analytical tradition.

Section Three comprises passages from Brentano,
Scheler and Sartre, as well as a specially-commissioned article on Heidegger’s
theory of the emotions by Charles Guignon (required due to the obstinacy of
Heidegger’s literary executors, Solomon informs us). Brentano’s contribution
consists primarily in a discussion of intentionality (as might be expected),
which should help the reader understand much of the philosophical literature.
The Phenomenological tradition is well represented by Scheler and Heidegger.
The section taken from Sartre’s The Emotions: A Sketch of A Theory is essential,
comprising as it does an attack on the James-Lange theory stemming from the
writer’s famous account of human freedom. Emotions, argues Sartre, are
voluntary strategies to avoid committing oneself to action. Emotive behavior,
according to Sartre, ‘is not effective‘. It is a lesser form of action,
a psychological reaction that occurs when ‘we can no longer live in so urgent
and difficult a world’. This account, then, can also be seen to stand in
opposition to the Aristotelian account of emotion as virtuous and appropriate.

Part Four, entitled ‘Conceptual Analysis and
Emotion’, focuses on philosophical work broadly placed in the dominant
Anglo-American tradition, and has been expanded significantly from the first
edition. Originally containing six entries, five new papers have been added and
one, by Irving Thalberg, lost.

The papers here represent the broad range of
approaches to the phenomena found in modern Anglophone philosophy. We have
Ryle’s classic behaviorist approach, developed further in Errol Bedford’s
paper; the cognitive approach, argued for by Solomon in his contribution and
challenged by Calhoun and by Michael Stocker. Paul Griffiths goes further,
presenting a challenge to the whole project by taking an eliminativist stance
towards the idea of the emotions in general. The influence of Darwinian
evolutionary theory can be found throughout the section. Ronald De Sousa and
Patricia Greenspan focus upon the connection between rationality and emotion.
Anthony Kenny, in a passage from Action, Emotion and Will, [reviewed in Metapsychology
August 2003] focuses upon intensionality in a discussion that may prove
somewhat difficult for the non-philosopher. Finally, Martha Nussbaum takes us
back to the start with a thorough and intelligent critique of the Stoic view,
drawing upon much recent psychological work in the process.

Whereas the first edition seemed a balanced,
impartial collection, this edition may seem rather more geared towards the
analytical philosopher with an interest in the sciences, or the scientist
interested in analytical philosophy. To criticize the book for this would be
churlish, though. Solomon, a writer familiar with both Continental and
Anglophone philosophy, appears to have expanded the volume in an attempt to
make it more representative of recent work on the emotions, which has tended to
come from within the psychological and analytical fields. It is an unavoidable
result of this is that the historical literature and work within the
Continental tradition may appear somewhat sidelined. Still, a few further
additions to Part One may have restored a sense of balance to the volume.

The second edition of What Is an Emotion? is
still an essential resource for any student of the emotions. Given the quantity
and quality of recent work, those lecturers and students familiar with the
first edition should think about bringing things up to date with this volume.
For other readers, few other books would serve to give such an accurate and
rewarding picture of the place of philosophy and psychology in shedding light
on such a fundamental part of human nature.

 

© 2003 Chris Lindsay

 

Chris Lindsay teaches philosophy at the University
of Glasgow, Scotland.

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology