Elliot D. Cohen is well known in the philosophical
counseling community as a founding member and director of the Society for
Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy in the United States and the author
of several respected books in that and related fields. The present work is
written for a lay audience and is intended as a self-help book for any
intelligent person who has the ability and the willingness to order their own
lives rationally.

The basic premise of the book is that any person’s
practical thinking can be analyzed in accordance with the form of the practical
syllogism so as to uncover the major premise (which Cohen calls a ‘rule’) and
the minor premise (called a ‘report’) which led to the action or to the
emotional reaction of that person in a given situation. Following Aristotle,
Cohen believes that one’s feelings and emotions, like one’s actions, flow
deductively from one’s reasoning albeit that the latter may contain many
assumptions of which one is not aware. The task of ‘self-control through the
power of reason’ begins with bringing these assumptions into consciousness. The
next step is to refute those premises which can be seen to be faulty. To this
end, a person should be aware of standard fallacies, such as hasty
generalization and believing without adequate evidence, to which we are all
prone. However, clarifying and correcting one’s thinking will often not be
enough. One must also exercise willpower so as to undo the habits of thinking,
acting, and feeling into which one has fallen in the past. It will be one’s
clearheaded awareness of the faults of previous thinking and the necessity of
correct thinking for the future that will drive this effort of self-control.

Cohen illustrates his method with telling examples
and describes patterns of faulty thinking and inappropriate emotional reaction
which he designates as ‘fallacies’. Fallacies of emotion include ‘demanding
perfection’ and ‘though shalt upset yourself’ while more cognitive fallacies
include ‘black-or-white thinking’ and ‘magnifying risks’. The extensive explications
that Cohen provides for these and many other thinking patterns would help
reflective readers recognize and confront such faulty forms of thought in
themselves. Moreover, such fallacies often arise in sets which he designates as
‘syndromes’. Cohen also provides readily understandable strategies for
countering these patters, which he calls ‘antidotes’. Finally, he offers
helpful advice on handling such troublesome emotions as anger, anxiety, and
depression.

While the title of the book indicates an Aristotelian
inspiration, the stronger influence on the book, as Cohen himself acknowledges,
is that of Albert Ellis’ Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy. Apart from the
structure of the practical syllogism and reference to the Golden Mean, there is
no reference to such Aristotelian concepts as a fundamental human tendency
towards happiness or the virtue of practical judgment (phronésis). There
is however, one theme which is drawn, if not from Aristotle specifically, then
from the more general philosophical anthropology of the ancient Greek
philosophers: namely, that of control of the passions on the part of reason. It
is a matter for scholarly discussion as to whether Aristotle’s holistic model
of the human person can be bifurcated to the extent needed for theorizing
self-control in this somewhat dualistic manner. It should certainly not be
demanded of this book that it broaches this matter. But one is left with a
lingering doubt as to whether rational self-control is adequately conceived
when it is described as an exercise of muscular willpower which sets out to
subdue the unruly emotions (an image that is more at home in Plato than in
Aristotle). The reason why one has this doubt is because of the assumption that
the book makes that being rational and determined is enough to give people the
degree of awareness and command of themselves that would be needed for them to
overcome their problems. Aristotle’s view would be that mature virtuous persons
do not need this kind of muscular self-discipline because their emotions and
desires are consistent with, and inform, their reason so as to issue in
‘prudent’ practical judgments. Such persons are at one with themselves. But
then, apart from training for the immature and education for the more mature,
Aristotle does not tell us how to achieve this ideal state.

Cohen’s assumption also seems quite unaware of the
unconscious drives and motivations which modern depth psychology has disclosed
to us and which militate against the kind of lucidity which Cohen’s
self-reflection demands and against the kind of self-control which clear
thinking and willpower are said to promise. What if one’s phobia or distorted
perception won’t yield to willpower? It is striking that in some of his cases
Cohen recommends behavior modification training strategies, and that in the
case of his own father’s death, he has to allow himself to be irrational and to
let go of self-control. Perhaps the solution to this problem, as with any case
of philosophical counseling, is to ensure that the client or, in this case,
reader of the book, does not have the kind of psychological problem which is
intractable to reflection and critical thinking. If we leave cases of psychosis
and neurosis to one side (and where is the borderline?), then Cohen’s approach
can surely be helpful in leading people to greater self-awareness, more
rational decisions, more appropriate emotions, and more harmonious
interpersonal relationships.

It is certainly a strength of this book and of the
classical worldview that lies behind it that people are encouraged to take
responsibility for their own actions and reactions and to seek to improve them
by way of their own efforts. This can only be seen as a welcome departure from
the promised quick fixes and the ‘triumph of the therapeutic’ which are so
widespread today.

©
2003 Stan van Hooft

Stan van Hooft teaches philosophy at Deakin
University in Australia. He is the author of Caring: An Essay in the
Philosophy of Ethics, Niwot CO, University Press of Colorado, (1995), and
numerous journal articles on ethics, philosophical psychology, and applied
philosophy. He can be contacted at stanvh@deakin.edu.au

Categories: Ethics, Philosophical