According to David Hume, "The
wise man, therefore, proportions his belief according to the evidence." 
After reading Jane Maienschein’s Whose View of Life: Embryos, Cloning, and
Stem Cells  (Harvard University Press, 2003) I want to add, "And so,
we see, does the wise woman"

Maienschein, a historian of developmental biology at
Arizona State University, holds that a better understanding of developmental
biology could help toward resolving policy disputes about research using
embryos, cloning, and stem cells in ways consistent with the science and
respectful of the opposing sides.  As she sees it, such understanding is to be
gained through attention not only to contemporary science, but also to its
history She says,

"By viewing current claims of
moral truth in historical perspective, we can defuse the efficacy of the
argument, if not the passion of the arguer.  …we can understand the way that
the past debates have shaped and constrained our current conditions…."
(p.8) 

She frames the central question as having to do with
"…when a life begins, or when we have something that we want to define
as a life on its way to becoming an individual, independent organism; this is
what I mean by ‘a life’." (p.9) 

However, her book covers far more
than this.  In providing a highly readable and reliable account of the history
of attempts to understand the details of animal reproduction, she offers an essential
background for all who wish to base their views concerning the controversial
issues of cloning, stem cell research and the scientific use of human embryos
on evidence rather than on a fear of the unknown.

Her history begins, as so many do,
with Aristotle whose view in The Generation of Animals was that
reproduction was a gradual process, involving qualitative as well as
quantitative changes, a process called epigenesis.  This view was challenged in
the seventeenth century by Hartsoeker, and others, who claimed to have observed
an already preformed homunculus curled up in spermatozoa.  The development of a
new life involves the growth of an already existing entity. This preformationist
view has its contemporary descendents in those who maintain that a fertilized
ovum has all the parts necessary for the development of the organism.  Those
who believe that a more precise, detailed understanding of early development
requires recognition of the many distinct steps involved are the heirs to
Aristotle’s epigenetic view.  Here we see the relevance of the history of
science to the present day public policy disputes.

Succeeding chapters summarize the
history of cell theory, experimental embryology, and genetics, with fascinating
forays into parthenogenesis, the cloning of frogs, and eugenics.  What becomes
apparent from this history is not just how much we have come to know about
reproduction, but also how much painstaking attention to precise details has
been involved, and how important the solution of "mere" technical
problems has been in the increased understanding of early human development. It
is the details of inquiry, rather than broad philosophical claims about
"human nature" that have guided scientific changes in our
understanding of human development.  These are general lessons about the nature
of scientific inquiry too often ignored in public discussions of science. 

Turning to contemporary
developments, Maienschein pays considerable attention to the recombinant DNA
disputes, the introduction of in vitro fertilization, the human genome project,
and the cloning of Dolly. Even when she expresses disapproval of the way many
individuals have responded to these scientific advances, she remains truly fair
and balanced in her assessments.  She may not appreciate Watson’s flamboyance
but she respects his leadership in the human genome project; perhaps Arthur Caplan
is too eager to make pithy pronouncements on complex matters, but she admires
his spirited defense of therapeutic cloning.  Even Leon Kass, who does not
share Hume’s or Maienschein’s respect for evidence is treated with dignity. 
She refers to Kass’s assertions about the "wisdom of repugnance" as a
form of intuitionism, grouping him with the influential philosopher G.E. Moore
rather than, say, calling his claim an appeal to fear based on ignorance. Some
of her harshest remarks are directed towards the sensationalism of reports of
scientific results, specifically the cloning of the sheep Dolly. Even here,
while she is strongly critical of the early reporting by Gina Kolota, she
acknowledges that her later stories were more balanced.

Maienschein is attempting to do two
things. First, she is trying to provide a detailed account of the science of
human development in its historical context.  Here she is valiantly battling
the general ignorance of science in general and biology in particular,
especially among those who establish and enforce policy.  Secondly, she is
using her scientific background to combat those who believe that in
establishing public policy, science should be used only to support policies
already promoted on other bases.  When people believe that they already know
what is right (or more generally what is wrong), their attitude toward science
is "Don’t bother me with the facts." Reason and evidence are the only
weapons we have to combat irrationality and prejudice although to what extent
they are effective in present day America remains a question.  Perhaps, by
phrasing the central issue in terms of "when a life begins," Maienschein
has left open the door for those who would exploit the multiple ambiguities of
the term "life" to promote their agenda.  Nevertheless, she has done
her part to defend reason and evidence, and for that, she deserves the
attention and admiration of citizens concerned with the future of science in
the United States.

© 2006 Hannah Hardgrave  

Hannah Hardgrave, Lecturer,
Department of Philosophy, Wake Forest University

Categories: Ethics, Genetics